Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 31 | Issue 1

Article 8

First In, First Out: Promises and Problems of Free
Expression in Revolutionary and PostRevolutionary Governments
Benjamin Pomerance

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Recommended Citation
Benjamin Pomerance, First In, First Out: Promises and Problems of Free Expression in Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary Governments,
31 Md. J. Int'l L. 107 ().
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol31/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

POMERANCEFINALBOOKPROOF

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

Article
First In, First Out: Promises and Problems of
Free Expression in Revolutionary and PostRevolutionary Governments
BENJAMIN POMERANCE†
“Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely
according to conscience, above all liberties.”
John Milton, Areopagitica (1644)1
“All that makes existence valuable to any one, depends on the
enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people.”
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859)2
For centuries, advocates for societal change have sought greater
legal protections for freedom of expression. Some of the most
influential revolutions from the past three hundred years arose in
significant measure from citizens demanding such safeguards, risking
their lives to attack existing regimes, and demanding that their
© 2016 Benjamin Pomerance.
† Benjamin Pomerance received his J.D. from Albany Law School and his B.A. from the
State University of New York at Plattsburgh. He presently serves as a Deputy Director for the
New York State Division of Veterans’ Affairs. This article is an expansion of a presentation
that he delivered at the Law & Society Association’s international conference in Seattle. All
research and opinions herein are his own and are not necessarily the opinions of any other
group, organization, or entity. He owes the utmost thanks to the devoted staff of the Maryland
Journal of International Law; to his parents, Ron and Doris Pomerance, for their constant
inspiration; and to all people who have sacrificed so much to protect freedom of speech.
1. Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton, reprinted in JOHN MILTON PROSE:
MAJOR WRITINGS ON LIBERTY, POLITICS, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION 209 (David Loewenstein,
ed., 2013) (1644) .
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5 (H.O. Houghton, 2d ed. 1863) (1859).
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government grant the people this liberty. Promises of enhanced
freedom of expression were, for instance, at the forefront of messages
that galvanized revolutionary efforts in eighteenth-century North
America and France, twentieth-century Russia and Cuba, and twentyfirst century Egypt and Tunisia.3 In each of these successful uprisings,
rebels ardently supported new leaders who repeatedly vowed to
expand the legal latitude for people to express themselves without fear
of government-imposed sanctions.4
After the revolution, however, all of these governments quickly
changed course.5 Before long, the new leaders who rose to the top
through the backing of a citizenry that devoured their promises—
including their paeans to free speech and expression—vigorously
instituted their own measures abridging the general public’s ability to
speak and express.6 State control of speech and expression developed
and spread, governmental actors imposed harsh punishments upon
people who defied these restrictions, and the revolutionary assurances
of legally protected communications soon became a distant and
presumably unobtainable memory.7
This article looks closely at this centuries-old phenomenon and
proposes some explanations for its recurrence. By studying six
revolutions that began with popular demands for greater freedom of
expression and pledges from revolutionary leaders to enhance this
liberty, and concluded with a state-inflicted backlash against freedom
of expression shortly after the revolution ended, this article examines
the mechanics of free expression’s “first in, first out” role in these
struggles. Discerning common trends among these revolutions that
vary so greatly in time period, geographic area, and affected culture
sheds some light upon freedom of expression’s apparent role as a
promise that revolutionary leaders easily make and easily break, and
as an objective that many citizens easily abandon in post-revolutionary
societies.
Part I of this article discusses the central role that freedom of
expression played as a popular demand and a political promise in the
buildup to the American Revolution of 1783, the French Revolution of
1789, the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Cuban Revolution of 1959,
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
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and the “Arab Spring” revolutions of 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia.8 Part
II moves to the aftermath of these six revolutions, and explores the
various limitations and punishments that the post-revolutionary
governments installed to abridge the freedom of expression that these
leaders had so recently pledged to protect.9 Lastly, Part III draws upon
this historical summary to describe common factors and trends leading
to the rapid post-revolutionary reduction of legal protections for
speech and expression.10
This examination proves that throughout the centuries, and across
a tremendous range of nations and cultures, revolutionary leaders who
vow legal protections for freedom of expression utilize similar devices
of power and play upon analogous popular sympathies to rapidly
retract this promised freedom without sparking a new rebellion.
Through this discussion, this article illuminates larger truths about the
spectrum of needs among citizens in a post-revolutionary society, and
the overall value within this spectrum that the public generally places
upon freedom of expression in their daily lives.
I. FIRST IN: PRE-REVOLUTIONARY DEMANDS AND REVOLUTIONARY
PROMISES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. North America, 1783
Freedom of expression was far from a foreign concept in colonial
America.11 On the contrary, historical evidence reveals that American
revolutionaries rebelling against the British Crown believed they were
preserving a right of Englishmen that existed to a certain extent in law
and to a greater extent in practice.12 English legal scholar William
Blackstone, in his 1769 treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England,
declared freedom of the press “essential to the nature of a free state.”13
Even earlier, in the mid-1690s, the English Parliament had rejected a
proposal to renew the governmental system of “licensing” all printed
texts from any British subject before publication, a practice that had
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 21 (1965).
12. KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 1 (2004).
13. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND vol. IV, at 151
(1978).
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existed in Great Britain for more than a century.14 The Declaration of
Rights in 1689 prevented prosecution of any British subject petitioning
the King regarding a perceived royal wrongdoing.15 Furthermore,
members of Parliament, as the representatives of the people, held
immunity from prosecution for statements made about governmental
leaders, current events, and other matters of governance.16
On the other hand, as Professor Leonard Levy and other scholars
have pointed out, the laws of colonial America did not honor a right to
free expression that comes remotely close to today’s safeguards under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.17 Instead, the
prevailing legal views of the colonial era permitted the government to
punish a wide range of post-spoken or post-publication forms of
expression.18 For example, English common law recognized the crime
of seditious libel, punishing subjects of the Crown who criticized the
government to the point of lowering its esteem in the public eye.19
Truth of the critique was not a viable defense.20 Further chilling speech
and expression was the transgression of “constructive treason,”
allowing the government to prosecute for the high crime of treason any
individual who expressed anti-government sentiments.21
Even
Blackstone wrote that freedom of the press did not protect against

14. David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429,
443 (1983). However, attempts to reintroduce licensing or other forms of government-held
prior restraints continued for more than two decades after Parliament rejected renewal of the
licensing act. Id. at 444.
15. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession
of the Crown, 1689, Bill of Rights (Eng.) (“That it is the right of the subjects to petition the
king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.”).
16. WERHAN, supra note 12, at 1.
17. E.g., JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISONI,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 436–38 (1989); LEONARD LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 19–
20, 55, 85–86 (1960); ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2007) (“Colonial America began with little tolerance
of dissent.”); Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1156, 1173–74 (1986).
18. WERHAN, supra note 12, at 6 (“Mainstream legal thought in the American colonies,
as in England, assumed not only that individuals were free to speak their minds, but also that
they were legally accountable for the harmful tendencies of their speech.”).
19. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL,
“OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES 74 (2012).
20. Ronald W. Eades, The Control of Seditious Libel as a Basis for the Development of
the Law of Obscenity, 11 AKRON L. REV. 29, 32 (1977).
21. ALFRED H. KNIGHT, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: THE PEOPLE AND CASES THAT HAVE
SHAPED OUR SOCIETY, FROM KING ALFRED TO RODNEY KING 143 (1996).
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“censure for criminal matter” after publication.22
In spite of these legal limits, however, robust discourse about
matters of public concern existed largely unfettered in the thirteen
colonies.23 In fact, Professor Keith Werhan notes that speech and
expression in the colonies likely “was far freer than in the mother
country.”24 One can witness the truth of this statement within the
outrage among so many American colonists after Great Britain used
the “Intolerable Acts” to limit town meetings in Massachusetts,
demonstrating that the colonists already recognized a tradition of open
gatherings in which individuals spoke without censorship about
political affairs.25 Similarly, the fact that the revolutionary leaders
openly discussed their opposition to the new British laws in
convocations from the Stamp Act Congress to the First Continental
Congress—and voiced that opposition without facing conviction for
treason—indicates that an atmosphere of at least some of freedom
expression existed in the colonies before the Revolution even began.26
England’s geographic distance from North America caused
unwieldy governance in which the colonists could to a certain extent
ignore the laws and precepts of England.27 Historians generally accept
that this distance led to the growth of a separate American identity,
strengthening the overall belief that revolution against the Crown was
necessary to retain that individuality in the world.28 Free speech and
22. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 151–52.
23. See, e.g., DAVID A. COPELAND, DEBATING THE ISSUES IN COLONIAL NEWSPAPERS:
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD 10–12 (2000) (listing and quoting excerpts
from several publically published and disseminated defenses of freedom of speech, the press,
and general expression in the colonies); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 46 (2000);
LARRY ELDRIDGE, A DISTANT HERITAGE: THE GROWTH OF FREE SPEECH IN EARLY AMERICA 3
(1994) (“[C]olonists experienced a dramatic expansion of their freedom to criticize
government and its officials across the seventeenth century.”); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 911 (1993) (stating that
some Americans around the time of the Revolution went as far as calling for “a freedom to
speak and publish as one pleases”); Bogen, supra note 14, at 433–34 (describing the success
of colonial local assemblies in establishing guarantees for free expression in legislative debate,
paralleling the British parliamentary privilege).
24. WERHAN, supra note 12, at 6.
25. See, e.g., KENNETH J. MOYNIHAN, A HISTORY OF WORCESTER 1674–1848, at 72–73
(describing one Massachusetts town’s rebellion against this act, including creating new local
political institutions that could hold meetings about the issues of the day).
26. JOSEPH C. MORTON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 33–35 (2003); EDWARD
COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (2003).
27. Id. at 33–34.
28. Id.; see also ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT F. H. . .BERT, A HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC THEORY AND METHOD 64 (6th ed. 2014).
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expression in a higher degree than what English common law
specifically allowed was part of that new American identity.29 Many
of the American Revolution’s intellectual leaders were well-versed in
the philosophers of the European Enlightenment movement,
individuals such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Baron de
Montesquieu.30 Overall, Enlightenment theorists held as a central
precept that the best governments were based on principles of reason
and rationale rather than absolute authority and tradition.31 Extending
this concept into practical governance, many Enlightenment writers
stated that good governments protected certain natural laws, rights that
inherently belong to all men.32 Early American leaders generally
agreed that at least some degree of freedom of expression was a natural
law that government needed to safeguard.33
Notably, these individuals typically did not call for unlimited
freedom of speech and expression.34 However, most American
revolutionaries of this era perceived free speech and expression as a
natural law and demanded the formation of a government that would
promise protection of those inherent liberties.35 An example of this
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Another key sign pointing to the increasing
colonial desire for freedom of expression came from the trial of printer John Peter Zenger for
seditious libel in 1735. Zenger was acquitted when twelve New York jurors ignored the
judge’s instructions regarding the crime of seditious libel, adopting instead the arguments
raised by Zenger’s lawyers that the truth of Zenger’s statements against the colonial governor
general provided a valid defense. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION
163 (1969). See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRYAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL: WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS (2010).
Still another influential defense of free expression came from Benjamin Franklin, whose
Apology for Printers in 1731 defended the dissemination of multiple competing viewpoints as
benefiting society overall. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM 108–9 (Stephen L.
Vaughn ed., 2008).
30. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 13, 18–19 (1996); Bruce W. Sanford & Jane E. Kirtley, The First
Amendment Tradition and its Critics, in THE PRESS 264 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall
Jamieson eds., 2005).
31. See GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM: PUBLIC REASON AS
A POST-ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT 1–2, 4–5 (2003).
32. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ECONOMIC THOUGHT BEFORE ADAM SMITH: AN
AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT vol. I, at 369 (1995).
33. Hamburger, supra note 23, at 919.
34. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 22 (1971); LEVY, supra note 17, at vii.
35. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 132–
33 (1993) (stating that at minimum, the Framers of the United States Constitution and the Bill
of Rights wanted to prevent the government from enacting laws that would “shut off dissent
or to insulate itself from criticism”); THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: THE FIRST 200 YEARS
43 (Richard C. Simmons ed., 1989) (“During the subsequent congressional debate over the
Bill of Rights, [James] Madison identified freedom of speech and of the press as among ‘the
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commitment comes from the First Continental Congress’s Appeal to
the Inhabitants of Quebec in 1774, which, on the topic of freedom of
the press, states:
The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth,
science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal
sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential
promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are
shamed and intimated, into more honourable and just modes of
conducting affairs.36
One can reasonably draw parallels between this promise of a new
government guaranteeing freedom of expression and the far more
famous promises of these liberties in the Constitution and the First
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. For example, the Constitution’s
definition of the crime of treason is considerably more limited than the
English common law definition, guarding against the offense of
“constructive treason” that hampered free speech and expression under
British rule.37 Likewise, the Constitution’s “Speech and Debate
Clause” provides members of Congress immunity from prosecution for
remarks made in carrying out their legislative duties, a carryover from
the similar privilege in English common law.38
Yet no promise to preserve freedom of speech and expression
resonated more than the First Amendment’s guarantee of these
liberties, a statement beginning with the pronouncement that
“Congress shall make no law” abridging the rights protected therein.39
As discussed earlier, the intent behind this broad and seemingly
definitive language likely was not as absolute as the words outwardly
imply.40 Still, the mere presence of protections for speech and the press
most valuable on the whole list’.”); STEPHEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY
44 (2008) (stating that although the Framers understood that some speech could be regulated
to protect other rights, freedom of speech was at its core a natural right).
36. Letter from the Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of the Province of Quebec
(Oct. 26, 1774), reprinted in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 693, 695
(1999).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. However, some of the Framers pushed for considerably broader constitutional
language regarding the protections of speech and expression. For instance, James Madison’s
original version of what would become the First Amendment “impl[ied] a bar on all federal
authority respecting speech of press.” LEVY, supra note 17, at 279, 278–80. During the
Constitutional Convention itself, Elbridge Gerry and Charles Pinckney sought to introduce a

POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW

114

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

[Vol. 31:107

at the outset of the Bill of Rights — a document that many
revolutionary leaders demanded before they would agree to the
Constitution on the whole — represents a substantial vow from the
governors of this new nation to protect these rights for all of its
citizens.
B. France, 1789
Much like the desire for protecting freedom of expression
manifested itself during discussions about the Stamp Act and other
financial matters prior to the American Revolution, one of the first
outcries for freedom of political expression in France arose out of fiscal
issues. By the 1780s, France’s economic situation was perilous, a
condition due largely to the nation’s participation in several costly
wars and the extravagance of the royal court.41 When King Louis XVI
summoned the Estates-General—a political body that purportedly
represented the interests of the clergy, the nobility, and the common
people of France—to chart France’s financial future, national elections
for representatives were necessary since this legislative entity had not
met since 1614.42
During these elections, Louis XVI took the surprising step of
suspending censorship of publications, even allowing writings that
criticized the monarchy.43 As a result of the king’s decision, France
was deluged with pamphlets and newspapers calling for a social and
economic overhaul of the entire country.44 This concept of a free press
went against the historic limitations on spoken or printed words that
defiled certain sacrosanct aspects of French life, particularly the
Catholic clergy—who were seen as guardians of moral, honorable, and
orderly living—and the monarchy, viewed as the supreme authority
safeguarding this traditional way of life.45

provision that freedom of the press “be inviolably preserved.” Fred B. Hart, Power of
Government Over Speech and Press, 29 YALE L.J. 410 (1920).
41. Eugene Nelson White, The French Revolution and the Politics of Government
Finance, 1770–1815, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 227, 229 (1995); Thomas J. Sargent & Francois R.
Velde, Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution, 103 J. POL. ECON. 474, 474–75
(1995).
42. FLORIN AFTALION, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION 29
(1987).
43. A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 443 (Peter McPhee ed., 2012); SEAN
CONNOLLY, WITNESS TO HISTORY: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 10 (2003).
44. CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 10.
45. See generally CHARLES WALTON, POLICING PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION: THE CULTURE OF CALUMNY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 17–37 (2009);
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However, the desire to speak and publish freely was not foreign
to French intellectuals of this era. Inspired by many of the same
Enlightenment philosophers who instigated the American movement
for independence, a growing number of French thinkers were by this
point advocating for the reasoned governance that Voltaire,
Montesquieu, Rousseau, and their brethren had supported.46 Statesponsored censorship of all opposing views was, to them, an example
of irrational government.47 The success of the American Revolution in
toppling a regime that was perceived as illogical only buoyed the
growing spirit in France that complete social change, including
increased legal protections for speech and expression, was possible
now.48
Among the greatest champions of freedom of expression was the
newspaper publisher Jacques-Pierre Brissot.49 In 1784, Brissot had
served time in the infamous French prison, the Bastille, for publishing
pamphlets criticizing the government in general and Queen Marie
Antoinette in particular.50 After his release, he traveled to the fledgling
United States of America.51 When Louis XVI announced that he would
convene the Estates-General, however, Brissot returned to France,
launching a newspaper titled The French Patriot in the summer of
Esther Janssen, Limits to Expression on Religion in France, 5 J. EUR. STUD. 22, 24–25 (2009),
http://www.ivir.nl/medewerkerpagina/janssen (noting that Catholicism functioned as the
official state religion of France until the Revolution, and that France criminalized the offense
of blasphemy against the church and its values until this law was abolished in 1791).
46. See ARTHUR DONOVAN, ANTOINE LAVOISIER: SCIENCE, ADMINISTRATION, AND
REVOLUTION 247 (1993); Harold J. Berman, Law and Belief in Three Revolutions, 18 VAL. U.
L. REV. 569, 616 (1984).
47. Again, however, these philosophers did not advocate for an absolute prohibition of
restrictions upon speech and expression. Instead, they generally supported the notion that the
general public’s ability to speak and express could be lawfully abridged when such speech and
expression could legitimately damage the state. See, e.g., Helena Rosenblatt, Rousseau,
Constant, and the Emergence of the Modern Notion of Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 133–36 (Elizabeth Powers ed., 2011).
48. Susheel K. Sharma, The American War of Independence and the French Revolution:
A Study in Influence, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY AND INFLUENCE ON LITERATURE
61 (T.R. Sharma ed., 1991).
49. Jonathan Israel, Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French
Revolution, INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDY, Spring 2014, https://www.ias.edu/ias-letter/israelrevolutionary-ideas (last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
50. For one of several discussions about the impact of this prison term upon Brissot’s
revolutionary inclinations, see Simon Burrows, The Innocence of Jacques-Pierre Brissot, 46
HISTORICAL J. 843, 845, 853–54 (2003). Ultimately, the author concludes that “[Brissot’s]
arbitrary arrest, together with the calumnies and evidence fabricated against him, had helped
to forge the revolutionary.” Id. at 871.
51. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 294 (David Andress ed., 2015)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION].
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1789.52 Around that same time, he submitted a treatise to the EstatesGeneral in which he declared liberty of the press “a natural right of
man.”53 In this document, he also defended preserving the theatre’s
freedom from censorship, stating that drama could greatly influence
the citizenry’s comprehension about matters of public concern.54
Brissot was hardly alone in this position.55 As the debates within
the Estates-General mushroomed from questions about France’s
economic problems into broader social and political issues, it became
increasingly clear that many individuals supported loosening restraints
on free speech and expression.56 By the summer of 1789, free speech
and expression represented one of several ideas that the existing
regime could no longer afford to ignore.57
Importantly, though, France’s outspoken proponents of free
speech and expression had varying ideas about what this concept
should mean. Brissot represented one pole of this debate, joined by
individuals like philosopher Jacques Andre Naigeon and dramatist
Marie-Joseph Chénier in calling for a virtually absolute legal
protection of free speech and expression.58 Most of the French
revolutionaries, however, advocated for a less extreme interpretation
of these principles, warning that unlimited freedom of speech and
expression could encourage deception, incitement to violence, and
other ugly results.59 A number of French thinkers retained a belief that
52. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AGE OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS AND NEW IDEOLOGIES, 1760–
1815, at 87 (Gregory Fremont-Barnes ed., vol. 1, 2007) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS].
53. Israel, supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION note 43, at 443 (“[W]hen the
Estates-General convened, several individuals challenged existing restrictions on newspapers
(royal privileges and censorship) by publishing newspapers to report on events regardless of
the consequences. By the summer of 1789 all such restrictions had fallen by the wayside.”).
56. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 46, at 620 n.60 (quoting E.J. LOWELL, THE EVE OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 324 (1892) (“In the decay of religious ideas, the Frenchmen of the
eighteenth century had set up a comparison independent of revelation. They had found it in
public opinion. The sociable population of Paris was ready to accept the common voice as
arbiter.”).
57. See Israel, supra note 49 (“By July 1789, the month of the storming of the Bastille,
the question was no longer whether revolutionary France should possess freedom of
expression and of the press—all the revolutionaries then agreed that it should—but rather
whether this freedom required limits.”).
58. Id.; SUSAN MASLAN, REVOLUTIONARY ACTS: THEATER, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 30–31 (2005).
59. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 375; Israel,
supra note 49; WALTON, supra note 45, at 39, 47.
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the government could still punish “calumny”—speech or expression
that caused injury to the broader society—as long as the state did not
engage in pre-publication censorship.60
Nevertheless, by the time Louis XVI dismissed and banished his
finance minister on July 11, 1789, there was little doubt that free
speech and expression were high on the list of demands from the
Frenchmen calling for change.61 Three days later, the storming of the
Bastille highlighted a bloody revolt on the streets of Paris, ultimately
forcing Louis XVI to yield to the sovereignty of the people.62 As the
revolution spread into the French countryside and peasants took up
arms against their lords, the National Constituent Assembly—the new
configuration of the Estates-General63—issued a declaration that the
feudal system in France was over.64
The revolution’s most important recognition of free speech and
expression, however, emerged later that month. On August 26, the
Assembly introduced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen, proclaiming the principles by which post-revolutionary France
would abide.65 Two of its seventeen articles centered specifically on
free speech and expression. Article 10 stated that no person “should be
disturbed for his opinions, even in religion, provided that their
manifestation does not trouble public order as established by law.”66
Even more emphatically, Article 11 declared “free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man.
Every citizen may therefore speak, write, and print freely, if he accepts
his own responsibility for any abuse of this liberty in the cases set by
the law .”67
60. WALTON, supra note 45, at 4–5.
61. See id. at 5 (noting that all three estates in the Estates-General possessed publically
recognized advocates for freedom of the press); Israel, supra note 49; A COMPANION TO THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 43, at 499 (stating that freedom of expression and opinion
was one of the bedrock goals of the French Revolution).
62. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 65–67.
63. This represented far more than a mere change of name. By assuming the title of a
“national assembly,” this group of deputies had declared itself a legislative body deriving
power from the French populace, rather than taking authority exclusively from the king. Id. at
275.
64. Id. at 276.
65. Id.
66. D. . .claration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 art. X (Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 1789 art. X) (Fr.) (“Nul ne doit être inqui. . .t. . . pour ses
opinions, même religieuses, pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l’ordre public . . .
tabli par la Loi.”).
67. Id. art. XI (“La libre communication des pens . . .es et des opinions est un des droits
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Thus, the stage was set for France’s future. Speech and expression
were officially proclaimed to be fundamental values in French society
and in the world as a whole. However, these preservations came with
limits, as the government could still outlaw and punish abusive speech
and expression that “troubled public order.”68 However, the question
of how this balance would play out between the French citizenry and
the newly constituted French government remained to be seen.
C. Russia, 1905
Social unrest plagued the Russian Empire for many years before
the Russian Revolution of 1905.69 A combination of harmful factors
triggered this discontent with the czarist government, including
famine, unemployment, government attempts at ethnic cleansing
throughout the empire, state-imposed restrictions on academic
freedom, and a series of largely disastrous attempts to industrialize
Russia too quickly.70 Desperate for reform, peasant farmers staged
protests, industrial workers formed illegal labor unions and engaged in
large-scale strikes, university students drafted petitions and pamphlets
condemning the czarist regime, and people from all walks of life
marched in solidarity—and even engaged in full-scale riots—against
the existing governmental conditions.71 Even state-inflicted measures
as extreme as forced military service, expulsion, and exile for
individuals engaging in these protests failed to end this growing stream
of anti-government sentiment.72
All of these tensions came to a head on January 22, 1905.73
Approximately 150,000 people marched through St. Petersburg to the
czar’s Winter Palace, carrying a petition stating that they would rather
les plus pr. . .cieux de l’Homme: tout Citoyen peut donc parler, . . .crire, imprimer librement,
sauf à r . . .pondre de l’abus de cette libert . . ., dans les cas d . . .termin. . .s par la Loi.”).
68. Id. art. X.
69. See e.g., William Elroy Curtis, The Revolution in Russia, NAT’L GEO. MAG., May
1907, at 302.
70. COMPETING VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 7–8 (Michael C. Hickey ed.,
2011); JACKSON J. SPIELVOGEL, WESTERN CIVILIZATION 854–56 (8th ed. 2009); SHEILA
FITZPATRICK, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 28 (2008); James D. White, The 1905 Revolution in
Russia’s Baltic Provinces, in THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905: CENTENARY PERSPECTIVES
59–61 (Anthony Heywood & Jonathan D. Smele, eds., 2005); RICHARD PIPES, THE RUSSIAN
REVOLUTION 4–9, 119–20, 119, 143 (1990).
71. See, e.g., SAMUEL D. KASSOW, STUDENTS, PROFESSORS, AND THE STATE IN TSARIST
RUSSIA 251–55 (1989); PIPES, supra note 70, at 4–9; FITZPATRICK’, supra note 70, at 28;
SPIEVOGEL, supra note 70, at 854–56.
72. See, e.g., PIPES, supra note 70, at 6–8.
73. FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33.
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die than continue living in conditions of poverty and oppression, and
containing several articles calling for change.74 The second article in
the document demanded “[i]mmediate proclamation of the freedom
and inviolability of the person, of freedom of speech and of the press,
of freedom of assembly, and of freedom of conscience in matters of
religion.”75
““Here we seek our last salvation,” the petition concluded. “Do
not refuse to come to the aid of your people . . . . Tear down the wall
that separates you from your people and let it rule the country together
with you.”76 Nothing in the petition called for Czar Nicholas II to
abdicate his throne.77 Nevertheless, the czar considered the massive
assemblage threatening, sending his armed troops into the streets.78
Shots were fired, and by the end of the day, more than a hundred of the
unarmed protestors lay dead, with many more wounded.79
Soon after these killings, more than 400,000 Russian industrial
workers went on strike.80 Peasants burned the homes of noblemen and
engaged in other forms of protest, refusing to cease even after imperial
police imposed harsh penalties upon them.81 Russian sailors mutinied
on the battleship Potemkin in the Black Sea.82 Some universities shut
their doors as students protestors walked out of their classrooms.83
Middle-class workers demanded that the czar create a constituent
assembly to ensure that the government respected the peoples’
wishes.84

74. See PIPES, supra note 70, at 24–25.
75. Petition Prepared for Presentation to Nicholas II, January 9, 1905 (Bloody Sunday),
http://academic.shu.edu/russianhistory/index.php/Workers%27_Petition,_January_9th,_1905
_%28Bloody_Sunday%29.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. PIPES, supra note 70, at 25.
79. AMY NELSON, MUSIC FOR THE REVOLUTION: MUSICIANS AND POWER IN EARLY SOVIET
RUSSIA 6 (2004); SIDNEY HARCAVE, FIRST BLOOD: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 98–117
(1964).
80. PIPES, supra note 70, at 26.
81. ABRAHAM ASCHER, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 31–32 (2014);
RICHARD S. WORTMAN, SCENARIOS OF POWER: MYTH AND CEREMONY IN THE RUSSIAN
MONARCHY FROM PETER THE GREAT TO THE ABDICATION OF NICHOLAS II 362 (2013).
82. See generally NEAL BASCOMB, RED MUTINY: ELEVEN FATEFUL DAYS ON THE
BATTLESHIP POTEMKIN (2008) (describing the mutiny and its effect of emboldening leaders of
the Revolution of 1905).
83. KASSOW, supra note 71, at 195–97.
84. DON C. RAWSON, RUSSIAN RIGHTISTS AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 26 (1995);
BASCOMB, supra note 82, at 85, 204.
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At first, Nicholas II ardently resisted adopting any changes that
would limit his power to rule.85 Ultimately, however, the effects of
nationwide strikes and persistent violence left him no other choice.86
On October 17, 1905, the czar reluctantly issued a document now
known as the “October Manifesto.”87 At the outset of this declaration,
he guaranteed freedom of speech to all Russian citizens, along with the
freedoms of assembly and association.88 The manifesto also created a
representative legislative body in Russia, an entity that allegedly would
limit the czar’s previously unchecked power and give a new voice to
the general population.89
The promises contained within this document effectively ended
the Revolution of 1905.90 Strikes ended, violent outbreaks subsided,
students returned to their university classrooms, and an overall mood
of celebration arose among the revolutionaries.91 While they had not
eliminated the existing regime, many of them believed that they had
accomplished what they had set out to achieve: the assurance of
fundamental individual liberties such as free speech and assembly, and
the creation of a new governmental body that would be accountable to
the people. Some revolutionary leaders, particularly the socialists,
objected that the revolution had not succeeded, noting that the October
Manifesto’s guarantee of free speech did not mean anything without
concrete changes and pointing out that the new legislature still required
the czar’s approval to pass laws.92 Overall, though, many Russians
seemed to believe that their revolutionary struggle had ended with
85. See, e.g., PIPES, supra note 70, at 43 (describing the czar’s reluctance to cede his
absolute power in the wake of Bloody Sunday); Curtis, supra note 69, at 304–05 (asserting
that Nicholas II’s closest advisor frequently told the czar that absolute rule was a gift to him
from God and could not be shared with the people).
86. KATHLEEN MALLEY-MORRISON, STATE VIOLENCE AND THE RIGHT TO PEACE:
WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 64 (2009) (stating that Nicholas II issued the October
Manifesto as a compromise only after he realized that no other way to retain power existed);
ASCHER, supra note 81, at 36 (stating that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevch, one of Czar
Nicholas II’s closest political advisors, threatened to shoot himself if the czar continued to
refuse to compromise with the citizens).
87. WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363; FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33.
88. PIPES, supra note 70, at 43.
89. WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363.
90. See FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33–34; PIPES, supra note 70, at 44.
91. GEOFFREY A. HOSKING, THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: GOVERNMENT
AND DUMA, 1907-1914 29 (1973) (stating that most local governments throughout Russia
accepted the October Manifesto as an adequate plan for the government’s future); ASCHER,
supra note 81, at 36 (“Within days, most workers, who were beginning to suffer great
hardships, returned to their jobs, even though it was not clear what powers the Tsar retained.”).
92. BRUNO NAARDEN, SOCIALIST EUROPE AND REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA: PERCEPTION AND
PREJUDICE 214 (1992); RICHARD CHARQUES, THE TWILIGHT OF IMPERIAL RUSSIA 137 (1974).
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triumph, and that days of far greater liberty lay ahead.93
D. Cuba, 1959
Most Cubans in the 1950s were not strangers to the concepts of
protecting civil liberties, including freedom of expression.94 As early
as 1869, the Constitution of Cuba provided legal safeguards for this
liberty, along with the freedoms of peaceable assembly, teaching,
religion, petition, and the press.95 The nation’s revised Constitution of
1940 not only committed the government to preserving these
freedoms, but added more individual liberties to the list as well,
including the maintenance of free and open elections.96 Most Cubans
appeared to take tremendous pride in their Constitution of 1940 and
the democratic society that it promoted.97 “[Cuba] could rightfully
claim its place alongside the select group of modern liberal
constitutional democracies of the world,” explained historian Louis A.
Perez in his book On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and
Culture. “Constitutional legality, free elections, freedom of speech,
and a free press were attributes of advanced civilizations by virtue of
which Cubans claimed membership.”98
One of the Constitution of 1940’s surprising sponsors was
Fulgencio Batista, a political strongman who had steered the nation’s
government since helping topple the nation’s military regime in 1933.99
Appointing himself chief of the armed forces, Batista was the obvious
power behind the throne for every Cuban president until winning
election to the presidency himself in 1940.100 Still, his staunch support
93. See HOSKING, supra note 91, at 29; ASCHER, supra note 81, at 36.
94. See LOUIS A. PEREZ, ON BECOMING CUBAN: IDENTITY, NATIONALITY, AND CULTURE
446–47 (2008); CLIFFORD L. STATEN, THE HISTORY OF CUBA 73 (2005); Nick Miroff, In
Havana, a Renovation in Marble—and Maybe in Spirit, Too, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-havana-a-renovation-in-marble—
and-maybe-in-spirit-too/2015/01/29/8cd7a9f0-a723-11e4-a162-121d06ca77f1_story.html.
95. See CONSTITUCION DE GUAIMARO, Apr. 10, 1869, art. 28.
96. CUBAN CONSTITUTION OF 1940, art. 33, art. 35, art. 36, art. 101, art. 102,
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/constitution-1940.htm.
97. See, e.g., SILVIA PEDRAZA, POLITICAL DISAFFECTION IN CUBA’S REVOLUTION AND
EXODUS 41 (2007); K. LYNN STONER, FROM THE HOUSE TO THE STREETS: THE CUBAN WOMAN’S
MOVEMENT FOR LEGAL REFORM, 1898-1940 183 (1991); Miroff, supra note 94 (describing the
Constitution of 1940 as a “high-water mark” for recognizing civil liberties in Cuba).
98. PEREZ, supra note 94, at 446–47.
99. AVIVA CHOMSKY, A HISTORY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 32 (2010).
100. DANIEL C. HELLINGER, COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AT
LAST? 285 (2014); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 61 (Spencer C.
Tucker, ed., 2013) (hereinafter “ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY”); RICHARD GOTT, CUBA: A
NEW HISTORY 142–44 (2005).
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of the progressive new constitution encouraged many Cuban
citizens.101 A peaceful transfer of power after Batista lost the 1944
presidential election to Ramon Grau San Martin appeared to be an even
greater symbol of stability and democratization in Cuban
governance.102
Free elections occurred again in 1948, bringing into office a new
president, Carlo Prio Socarras.103 Yet Socarras and his administration
soon found themselves mired in scandals and corruption, causing many
Cubans to lose faith in their leadership.104 Batista, who had moved to
Florida after losing the 1944 election, returned to Cuba and announced
his candidacy for the 1952 presidential race.105 When it became
obvious that he would lose, the man who had vehemently advocated
for the Constitution of 1940 violated virtually every principle for
which that document stood.106 Four months before the Cuban election
day, Batista staged a coup d’état, backed by both the Cuban military
and the United States government.107 Exactly one hour and seventeen
minutes later, Batista was Cuba’s new head of state.108
From 1952 onward, Batista’s government increasingly
suppressed the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, and virtually
every other civil liberties category that the Constitution of 1940
protected.109 He promised to hold free elections in 1954, but his heavy101. See CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 32.
102. See id.
103. See THOMAS G. PATERSON, CONTESTING CASTRO: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
TRIUMPH OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 26 (1995).
104. Id. (Grau and Prio swelled the civil service with political appointees eager to make
money for themselves; public officials raided pension funds and the treasuries of the national,
provincial, and municipal governments. The British Ambassador in Havana estimated that
Prio himself stole $90 million in public funds.”).
105. GOTT, supra note 100, at 146.
106. See id. When Batista learned that the nation’s military officers were planning to stage
a coup regardless of Batista’s participation, he decided to place himself at the helm of the
military’s efforts. Id.
107. Id.; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 32 (“When Batista led a second coup in 1952, there
was little organized opposition.”).
108. Richard Cavendish, General Batista Returns to Power in Cuba, HISTORY TODAY,
March 2002, http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/general-batista-returns-powercuba.
109. PATERSON, supra note 103, at 26–27; ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY, supra note
100, at 62; GOTT, supra note 100, at 146 (“After a perfunctory attempt to preserve the
constitutional niceties, and to repeat his experience of the 1930s by finding a figleaf president,
Batista appointed himself as chief of state . . . Much of the [C]onstitution of 1940 was
suspended, but most people . . . gave the new government the benefit of the doubt.”). Among
Batista’s changes were a series of strict restrictions upon speech and expression, including a
provision that allowed him to unilaterally suspend freedom of the press, speech, and assembly
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handed tactics discouraged all potential opponents.110 Ultimately, he
ran unopposed.111 To many Cubans, the values of liberty and
democratization in which they had taken such pride were now
obscured by a government that was an international embarrassment.112
This deeply felt discontent set the stage for a new face to abruptly
arise on Cuba’s political landscape: a young lawyer named Fidel
Castro.113 Beginning with a poorly planned, virtually suicidal attack on
the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba on July 26, 1953, Castro
dominated the opposition movement against Batista’s dictatorship.114
His rhetoric initially focused on restoring to Cuban citizens the
freedoms that the Constitution of 1940 had guaranteed, the very
liberties that Batista had eliminated.115
In short order, Castro was prosecuted for his role in the army
barracks attacks and exiled to Mexico.116 For the next two years, he
stimulated support among individuals willing to engage in armed
rebellion against the Batista government.117 Plans in place, his
supporters launched a series of guerrilla attacks throughout the nation,
maneuvers that received substantial support from an underground
press that glorified the fighters’ actions.118 As the revolutionaries
at any time for a forty-five-day period. STATEN, supra note 94, at 80.
110. See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 124 (2009).
111. Id. Four years later, the Cuban presidential elections featured two candidates
opposing Batista, but the elections were an obvious farce that unsurprisingly returned Batista
to power by a wide margin of victory. Id.
112. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSURGENCY, supra note 100, at 62.
113. See MAURICE HALPERIN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF FIDEL CASTRO: AN ESSAY IN
CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 13 (1972).
114. HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 9; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 36–38; Bryan Logan,
How Fidel Castro Rose to Power and Ruled Cuba for 5 Decades, BUSINESS INSIDER, Jan. 13,
2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/fidel-castros-life-and-rise-to-power-2015-1.
115. One of Castro’s primary messages in his now-legendary “History Will Absolve Me”
speech in October 1953, delivered from prison after his arrest for leading the revolt against the
army barracks, focused on reinstating the Constitution of 1940. See Rudo Kemper, Cuban
Memories: The Cuban Constitution of 1940, Then and Today, U. MIAMI CUBAN HERITAGE
COLLECTION, Oct. 14, 2010, http://library.miami.edu/chc/2010/10/14/cuban-memories-thecuban-constitution-of-1940-then-and-today/.
116. CELESTINO HERES, UNPARDONABLE CRIMES—THE LEGACY OF FIDEL CASTRO:
UNTOLD TALES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 67 (2003).
117. KATIE MARSICO, FIDEL CASTRO: CUBAN PRESIDENT AND REVOLUTIONARY 36–38
(2010). Playing upon the notion that his July 26 attack on the army barracks was justified,
Castro began calling his cause “the July 26 Movement.” JULIA SWEIG, INSIDE THE CUBAN
REVOLUTION: FIDEL CASTRO AND THE URBAN UNDERGROUND 6 (2009).
118. TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY, GUERRILLAS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSURGENTS AND REGIMES SINCE 1956 16, 31–33, 174–78 (1992);
SWEIG, supra note 117, at 47.
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gained traction, Batista hastily restored constitutional guarantees, even
removing press censorship in all but one province, trying desperately
to curry the people’s favor.119
Yet Castro’s movement had gained too much support for the
existing government to stop him now. Ultimately, Batista was forced
to abdicate his presidency.120 On New Year’s Day in 1959, Castro’s
forces triumphantly claimed victory.121 The next morning, in a lengthy
speech at Cospedes Park in Santiago de Cuba, Castro laid out his
visions for Cuba.122 In doing so, he paid particular attention to the
restoration of freedom of expression for all:
Now anyone may speak out, whether they are for or against.
Anyone who wishes to do so may speak out. That was not the case here
previously because until the present time, [Batista’s followers] were
the only ones [allowed] to speak out; only they spoke out. And they
spoke against us. There will be freedom for those who speak in our
favor and for those who speak against us and criticize us.123
These promises appeared to call back the values of the
Constitution of 1940, the freedoms in which so many Cubans had taken
great satisfaction.124 All that remained to be answered was how Castro
and his new government would put these vows into practice.
E. Tunisia and Egypt, 2011
On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor
named Mohammed Bouazizi stood outside a provincial government
building, doused gasoline over his body, and set himself on fire.125
Earlier that day, a police officer had confiscated his supposedly
unlicensed pushcart and the produce that Bouazizi was trying to sell.126
When Bouazizi offered to pay a fine, the officer allegedly slapped him,
spat in his face, and insulted his family.127 Seeking to report the
119. SWEIG, supra note 117, at 95–96.
120. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN DICTATORS: FROM NAPOLEON TO THE PRESENT 29 (2006).
121. HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 17–18.
122. FIDEL CASTRO READER 107 (David Deutschmann & Deborah Shnookal, eds., 2008).
123. Id. at 129.
124. See supra notes 94–98and accompanying text.
125. Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME,
(Jan. 21, 2011), www.content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Marc Fisher, In Tunisia, Acts of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of
POST
(Mar.
26,
2011),
Revolution
Through
Arab
World,
WASH.
www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-
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mistreatment, Bouazizi went to the provincial headquarters, only to
find that the governmental officials had no interest in hearing his
story.128 Less than an hour later, he lit the flame that severely burned
his body and led to his eventual death—and ignited a series of
revolutions now known as the “Arab Spring” throughout North Africa
and the Middle East.129
Bouazizi never set out to become a political martyr.130
Nevertheless, his suicide proved to be the tipping point for several
states whose citizens had long lived under autocratic regimes.131 Zine
al-Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia since 1987.132 In Egypt, Hosni
Mubarak had maintained power for an even longer period of time,
enjoying a three-decade tenure in office.133 Both of these leaders
openly denied freedom of expression to their citizens, silencing
opponents with harsh tactics.134 Additionally, Mubarak and Ben Ali—
along with other dictatorial leaders within this region—exploited
claims that they were “protecting” their constituents from outside
“threats” to establish domineering security regimes, impose
“emergency” laws that remained in effect for decades, and other tactics
designed to stifle any form of dissent.135 In 2009, the United States
ambassador to Tunisia sent a diplomatic cablegram stating: “Tunisia is
a police state, with little freedom of expression or association, and
revoltuion-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsuB_story.html.
128. Fisher, supra note 127; Abouzeid, supra note 125.
129. Ivan Watson & Jomana Karadsheh, The Tunisian Fruit Seller Who Kickstarted Arab
(Mar.
22,
2011),
Uprising,
CNN
www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/22/tunisia.bouazizi.arab.unrest/.
130. Abouzeid, supra note 125 (“Mohammed Bouazizi never set out to be a byword.”).
131. Allia Calkins, A Rude Awakening: Free Speech and the Arab Spring, VAND. POL.
REV., Oct. 13, 2013, http://www.vanderbiltpoliticalreview.com/a-rude-awakening-freespeech-and-the-arab-spring.html (“This seemingly innocuous act set off a chain reaction that
led to the fall of dictatorships in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and many other states in the Arab
world.”).
132. Profile: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, BBC, June 20, 2011, www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-12196679.
133. Profile: Hosni Mubarak, BBC, Nov. 29, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-12301713.
134. See, e.g., FRANK CASO, CENSORSHIP 81–84 (2008); BUILDING PEACE FROM WITHIN:
AN EXAMINATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED PEACEBUILDING AND TRANSITIONS IN AFRICA 270–
71 (Sylvester Bongani Maphosa, Laura DeLuca & Alphonse Keasley, eds., 2014) Nada
Mrabet, How Censorship Stifled Us in Tunisia, TUNIS TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013,
http://www.thetunistimes.com/2013/08/opinion-how-censorship-stifled-us-in-tunisia-70902/.
135. CASO, supra note 134, at 81 (“Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October
1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, declared a state of emergency . . . . The state of
emergency was renewed in 1988 and remained in effect through 2007.”); NOURI GANA, THE
MAKING OF THE TUNISIAN REVOLUTION: CONTEXTS, ARCHITECTS, PROSPECTS 244 (2013)
(describing the Tunisian State of Emergency Law that existed under Ben Ali’s rule).
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serious human rights problems.”136 The same description would
accurately depict Egypt during this time period as well.137
In a sense, the Arab Spring uprisings marked the first revolutions
where the participants sought to break this culture of censorship by
turning not only to the streets and public squares and traditional media
sources, but also to the Internet.138 Blogs, Facebook pages, Twitter
feeds, online forums, and other forms of social media became havens
for activists to protest existing methods of governance, make plans for
large-scale public demonstrations, and discuss the values that they
wanted a new government to achieve.139 For example, it was a blogger
who first uploaded to Facebook the video of Bouazizi setting himself
on fire, leading to its widespread sharing on the Internet and, before
long, mainstream media outlets.140 Similarly, the initial mass protest
in Egypt was advertised anonymously on Facebook, bringing together
tens of thousands of people to protest Mubarak’s dictatorship.141
Governmental attempts to remove online material criticizing the
current regimes only increased the revolutionaries’ efforts to restore
this information to the Internet.142
In Tunisia and Egypt, these calls for legally protected freedom of
expression appeared to be particularly strong. “We were silent before,”
one Tunisian citizen stated after Bouazizi’s death, “but Mohammed
showed us that we must react.”143 Broadly written statutes prohibiting
136. See
Amy
Davidson,
Tunisia
and
Wikileaks
NEW
YORKER,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/tunisia-and-wikileaks.
137. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, AND CITIZEN JOURNALISM 2002 (2013); CASO, supra note 134,
at 81–84.
138. For just a sampling of the recent literature on this topic, see ANDREW PETERSON &
PAUL WARWICK, GLOBAL LEARNING AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION 66–68 (2014);
PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., OPENING CLOSED REGIMES: WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
DURING
THE
ARAB
SPRING
(2011),
http://pitpi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-Hussain-Mari-Mazaid_pITPI.pdf;
Tim Eaton, Internet Activism and the Egyptian Uprisings: Transforming Online Dissent Into
the Offline World, 9 WESTMINSTER PAPERS IN COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE 3 (2013),
https://www.westminster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/220675/WPCC-vol9-issue2.pdf.
139. See note 138, supra. In fact, even before the Arab Spring revolutions occurred, active
bloggers in Egypt and Tunisia were adamantly advocating for governmental reform. HOWARD
ET AL., supra note 138, at 6.
140. MUHAMAD OLIMAT, ARAB SPRING AND ARAB WOMEN 10 (2013).
141. Jose Antonio Vargas, Spring Awakening: How an Egyptian Revolution Began on
Facebook,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
17,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-began-onfacebook.html; Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire,
WIRED, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/02/egypts-revolutionary-fire.
142. See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 138, at 7–17.
143. Abouzeid, supra note 125.
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vaguely defined classes of expression became particular enemies of the
protestors. Article 98(f) of the Egyptian penal code, for instance,
criminalized any communication that “exploits religion in order to
promote extremist ideologies by word of mouth or in any other
manner, with a view to stirring up sedition, disparaging or contempt of
any divine religion or its adherents, or prejudicing national unity.”144
Egyptian law also banned any expressions that “insulted” Egyptian
public officials, foreign diplomats, or foreign heads of state.145
Similarly, Tunisia possessed statutes such as Article 121.3 of their
penal code, which allowed sentences of up to five years in prison for
distributing or displaying any publications adjudged to “disturb public
order or undermine public morality.”146
In January 2011, Ben Ali announced that he would not seek reelection when his latest term of office ended in 2014.147 He also
delivered an unprecedented vow to remove censorship of the Internet
and traditional media outlets, and to allow the unimpeded formation of
opposing political parties.148 By this point, however, the people of
Tunisia were in no mood for promises.149 Just a few days later, the
still-rising tide of revolution forced Ben Ali to surrender his
presidency.150 In Egypt, a similar pattern of events began later that
month.151
After protests exploded in every major Egyptian
municipality, Mubarak addressed the nation, promising to loosen
restrictions on speech and expression, and guaranteeing other avenues
144. Egypt: A Year of Attacks on Free Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 11, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/11/egypt-year-attacks-free-expression.
145. Id.
146. See Rory McCarthy, Who is Threatening Free Speech in Post-Revolutionary
Tunisia?, FREE SPEECH DEBATE, Jan. 6, 2014, http://freespeechdebate.com/en/discuss/who-isthreatening-free-speech-in-post-revolutionary-tunisia/; Kerim Bouzouita, Tunisia’s Ground
Zero for Creative Freedom, SEISMOPOLITE J. OF ART & POLITICS, October 2012,
http://www.seismopolite.com/tunisias-ground-zero-for-creative-freedom.
147. Yasmine Ryan, Tunisia President Not to Run Again, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011113192110570350.html.
148. Id. (“Ben Ali promised broader political freedoms, including the formation of a
political party and that all censorship of the internet and traditional media would be halted.”).
149. See THE ARAB SPRING, DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
RAMIFICATIONS 3 (Efraim Inbar, ed., 2013); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND
CONTESTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 241 (Joel Beinin & Frederic Vairel,
eds., 2011) (hereinafter SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND CONTESTATION).
150. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced to Flee Tunisia as Protesters Claim Victory, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-presidentflees-country-protests.
151. David D. Kirkpatrick, Mubarak Orders Crackdown, With Revolt Sweeping Egypt,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
28,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29unrest.html?pagewanted=all.
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of constitutional reform.152 As in Tunisia, however, the move was too
little, too late. On February 11, Mubarak resigned, and the Egyptian
military took charge of the government.153
Shortly after these overthrows, calls for greater freedoms in the
speech and expression arenas emerged in both Tunisia and Egypt.154
Among these vows were the remarks of Mohamed Morsi, the man
whom the people of Egypt democratically elected as president, and
Moncef Marzouki, eventually installed by Tunisia’s interim parliament
as Ben Ali’s eventual successor.155 Both of these new leaders openly
pledged their support to the freedoms of speech and expression,
assembly, petition, and the like, stating that achieving stability in their
nations began with the recognition of such liberties for all people.156
Such sentiments echoed the strongly stated positions of many
individuals who rallied to the revolutions.157 Now, the world would
watch to see whether the promised broadening of these freedoms
would actually occur.

152. EDGAR THORPE, THE PEARSON GENERAL KNOWLEDGE MANUAL 2012 D.41 (2012);
Griff Witte, Janine Zacharia & William Branigin, Mubarak Forces Government to Resign;
Obama Urges Him to Deliver on Promises, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2011/01/25/AR2011012500866.html.
153. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html.
At the outset, the Egyptian military promised to stand in solidarity with the protestors,
understanding and meeting their demands for newfound freedoms. Id. However, this proved
to be far from the case. See infra Part III.E..
154. See, e.g., SONIA L. ALIANAK, THE TRANSITION TOWARDS REVOLUTION AND REFORM:
THE ARAB SPRING REALISED? 52 (2014);MARWAN BISHARA, THE INVISIBLE ARAB: THE
PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS 78 (2013) (“Freedom of expression, freedom
from fear, from want, from military intervention, and from war—those were their slogans from
the very outset.”).
155. See Gideon Rose, A Conversation with Moncef Marzouki, Council on Foreign
Relations, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/tunisia/conversation-moncef-marzouki/p35325;
Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi UN General Assembly Speech Transcript 2012, LATINO POST, Sept.
26, 2012, http://www.latinospost.com/articles/4611/20120926/egypts-mohammed-morsi-ungeneral-assembly-speech-mubarak-united-nations-transcript.htm.
156. See id. However, Morsi’s commitment to freedom of expression was far more muted
than Marzouki’s promises in this area. In his United Nations speech soon after his presidential
inauguration, Morsi stated that while Egypt strongly supported freedom of expression, this
expression did not extend to speech that insulted religions. See Paul Richter, In U.N. Speech,
Egypt’s Morsi Rejects Broad Free Speech Rights, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/26/world/la-fg-un-morsi-20120927
157. See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text.
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II. FIRST OUT: IMMEDIATE POST-REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTAL
ABRIDGEMENTS OF FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
A. United States
In 1798, President John Adams signed his name on a bill aimed
at restricting speech and expression in the United States.158 Known as
the “Sedition Act,” the new statute turned dissenting political opinions
into criminal behavior.159 Evidence that an individual intended to
oppose a government measure became proof enough to earn that
individual a conviction.160 Less than a decade after declaring that
“Congress shall make no law abridging” freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, the fledgling federal government had enacted a
measure accomplishing precisely what the First Amendment purported
to prevent.161
Multiple motivations inspired this law. Arguably, the dominant
factor focused on the young nation’s fear of impending war.162 In 1794,
the United States entered into a controversial treaty with their recent
enemy, Great Britain.163 In return for a series of diplomatic gains and
the British agreement to vacate forts in North America’s western
territories, the United States promised to grant Great Britain most
favored nation trade status and agreed not to interfere in the ongoing
war between Britain and France.164
Both of these measures angered the government of France.165 In
1796, the French retaliated by capturing American merchant ships and
158. Rochelle Raneri Zuck, Alien and Sedition Acts, in THE MAKING OF A MODERN
IMMIGRATION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS 13 (Patrick J. Hayes, ed., 2012).
159. See Douglas Bradburn, A Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and
Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 565 (July 2008) (describing the Sedition Act as “a new
law to criminalize seditious writing, talk, and behavior”).
160. Ch. 74, §2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
161. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1789 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 36 (2004) (“In this act, the Federalists [and the U.S.
government] declared war on dissent.”).
162. JAMES ROGERS SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW
NATION IN CRISIS 163 (1995).
163. TODD ESTES, THE JAY TREATY DEBATE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE EVOLUTION OF
EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 104 (2006).
164. See
generally
Jay
Treaty,
THE
LEHRMAN
INST.,
http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/jay-treaty.asp.
165. THE SUPREME COURT: CONTROVERSIES, CASES, AND CHARACTERS FROM JOHN JAY TO
JOHN ROBERTS 114 (Paul Finkleman, ed., 2014) (hereinafter “THE SUPREME COURT”) (“For
the French, the ratification of Jay’s Treaty was a slap in the face. After all, many Frenchmen
believed that the United States owed its very existence to French help.”).
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seizing their cargo.166 Quickly, Adams ordered three American
diplomats to meet with the French Foreign Minister, the Marquis de
Talleyrand, and negotiate an agreement that ended this practice.167
When the envoys arrived on French soil, however, they received word
from Talleyrand’s intermediaries that the French would stop seizing
American ships only if the United States provided France a lowinterest loan, paid American merchant claims against France, and
provided Talleyrand with a bribe of fifty thousand pounds.168
The American diplomats flatly rejected this proposal.169 After this
refusal, and the refutation of a second similar French offer, Talleyrand
threatened to invade the United States.170 When diplomatic dispatches
describing this threat arrived in Washington, Adams began preparing
the nation for war with France.171 Rumors about the likelihood of
hostilities ran rampant, with “public pronouncements couched in
extreme terms” igniting sentiments about how the United States should
deal with the alleged menace overseas.172 Jonathan Dayton, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, went as far as announcing
that a vast military force had gathered in France, preparing to launch
an offensive on United States soil—a claim that was completely
false.173
Against this combustible backdrop, the United States Congress
passed four related laws during a one-month period in 1798.174 Three
of these statutes focused on foreigners coming to the United States,
increasing the term of residency required to attain American
166. MATTHEW Q. DAWSON, PARTISANSHIP AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICA’S SECOND PARTY,
1796–1800 52 (2000).
167. Gregg Costa, John Marshall, The Sedition Act, and Free Speech in the Early
Republic, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1021–23 (1999).
168. Id. at 1022.
169. Id. In response to the requested bribe for Talleyrand, American diplomat Charles
Pinckney responded, “No, no; not a sixpence.” STONE, supra note 161, at 22.
170. ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE PACT: THE RADICAL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWERS AND THE ASSAULT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES 32 (2014).
171. See id. at 32–33; STONE, supra note 161, at 22–25
172. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WARS OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1783-1812
554 (Spencer C. Tucker, ed., 2014); RICHARD J. ELLIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 203 (2013); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 240–47 (2009); ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME
COURT AND RED MONDAY 14 (1999); ANDREW SANTELLA, JOHN ADAMS 29–30 (2002);
ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED
WAR WITH FRANCE 82–84 (1966); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 215, 215–17 (2003) (hereinafter Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime).
173. WOOD, supra note 172, at 245.
174. See generally Zuck, supra note 158.
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citizenship and empowering the President of the United States to arrest
any foreigner who was a citizen of an enemy nation and deport any
alien deemed “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States”
during peacetime.175 The fourth law in this group was the Sedition Act,
declaring that any expression aimed at “opposing or resisting any law
of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States,”
and publishing “any false, scandalous, and malicious writing”
criticizing the American government were high misdemeanor
offenses.176 Anyone found guilty of expressing their views about the
United States government in these prohibited manners could receive
steep fines or prison sentences.177
The four Alien and Sedition Acts passed despite stiff
opposition.178
Representative Edward Livingston specifically
denounced the Sedition Act as a reactionary, fear-driven reduction of
fundamental liberties.179
“No evidence [of American citizens
attempting to undermine the federal government and side with France],
then, being produced, we have a right to say that none exists, and yet
we are about to sanction a most important act, and on what ground?”
he demanded of his fellow legislators in one oration. “Our individual
suspicions, our private fears, our overheated imaginations.”180 Others
joined him in these objections.181
Even Adams himself questioned these measures, particularly the
Sedition Act, although he did not openly oppose them.182 Yet antiFrench feelings had reached a zenith, and the majority of the people
did not want to hear their president talk about diplomacy with the
175. See Marshall Smelser, George Washington and the Alien and Sedition Acts, 59 AM.
HIST. REV. 322, 322 (1954); STONE, supra note 161, at 33.
176. Ch. 74, §1, §2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
177. Ch. 74, §2, §3, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
178. See, e.g., Bradburn, supra note 159, at 565.
179. See RONALD H. BAYOR, THE COLUMBIA DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 177–79 (2004).
180. Id. at 178.
181. For instance, Albert Gallatin declared:
This [Sedition Bill] and its supporters suppose that whoever dislikes the
measures of the Administration and of a temporary majority in [C]ongress, and
shall, either by speaking or writing, expresses his disapprobation and his want of
confidence in men now in power, is seditious, is an enemy, not of Administration,
but of the Constitution, and is liable to punishment.
JAMES ROGERS SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN
CRISIS 163 (1995); see also WOOD, supra note 172, at 245.
182. See Laura Long, An Analysis of Congressional Arguments Limiting Free Speech, 52
COMMUNICATION L. REV. 52, 52 (2013).
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“enemy.”183 Fearing that the American people would revolt against the
government, he signed the bills into law, rationalizing them as “war
measures” to ensure the citizenry’s safety.184
Yet another plausible explanation existed for the passage of these
laws. Adams was a member of the Federalist Party, the dominant
political party in Congress and on the United States Supreme Court at
that time.185 Thomas Jefferson, the Vice-President, belonged to the
Democratic-Republican Party, which formed a significant minority in
Congress.186 The parties had engaged in an increasingly hostile
relationship with one another.187 Since the Federalists generally
believed that immigrants would typically vote with the DemocraticRepublicans, the three laws limiting the influence of aliens benefited
Federalist interests.188 Likewise, the power implicit within the Sedition
Act could allow the Federalist majority to censure DemocraticRepublican newspapers and speechmakers, thus controlling the
messages that the public heard leading up to the elections of 1800.189
The first arrest under the Sedition Act came on July 17, 1798,
shortly after the law’s passage.190 William Durrell, editor of a
Democratic-Republican newspaper in upstate New York, was indicted
for publishing “false scandalous malicious and [defamatory] Libel of
and concerning John Adams” and later convicted of seditious libel.191
Not long afterward, Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of the
Philadelphia Aurora and the grandson of Benjamin Franklin, became
a target of Federalist “committees of surveillance.”192 Eventually, they
183. See Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 172, at 217.
184. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 505–06 (2008). In addition, Adams adopted
the Blackstone-esque approach that the Sedition Act was acceptable because it did not involve
a prior restraint on speech. RICHARD L. WILSON, AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS 7 (2002).
185. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791
to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 274 (1986).
186. Craig R. Smith, The Aliens are Coming: John Adams and the Federalist Attack on
the
First
Amendment,
CTR.
FOR
FIRST
AMENDMENT
STUDIES,
http://www.firstamendmentstudies.org/wp/alien.html.
187. See David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 159 (2001).
188. Smith, supra note 186; Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, supra note 172, at 217.
189. See Gibson, supra note 185, at 273. In the words of Professor Geoffrey Stone:
“Suppressing speech because it is dangerous to the national interest is one thing; suppressing
it because it threatens a partisan interest is something else entirely. As the events of 1798
demonstrate, it is often difficult to tell the difference.” STONE, supra note 161, at 75.
190. RICHARD N. ROSENFIELD, AMERICAN AURORA: A DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN
RETURNS 690 (2014).
191. Id.
192. Id.; see also Ronald K. L. Collins, Benjamin Bache and the Fight for a Free Press,
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found what they wanted to uncover, leading to Bache’s arrest for
“libelling the President and Executive Government, in a manner
tending to excite sedition, and opposition to the laws, by sundry
publications and republications.”193 Only Bache’s death from yellow
fever prevented him from being forced to defend himself from this
accusation at a criminal trial.194
By the time the Sedition Act expired on March 3, 1801, a reported
twenty-five Americans had been arrested for seditious conduct.195
Fourteen individuals had been indicted on criminal charges under this
law.196 Ten of the indictments led to a criminal trial, all of them ending
in convictions.197 The forms of the purported “sedition” ranged from a
Massachusetts man putting up a liberty pole calling for “downfall to
the Tyrants of America” to a New Jersey man shouting out a drunken
comment against Adams’s administration.198
Still, from a free speech perspective, a silver lining eventually
emerged from this situation. With every arrest under the Sedition Act,
the public opposition to the Federalists grew, especially as the
anticipated war with France never materialized.199 People grew
disenchanted with the notion of the one party maintaining control of
all three federal government branches, recognizing that the lack of
opposition in power made it too easy for the political leaders to ignore
the individual rights of citizens.200 In sum, the fervor of nationalism
FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., July 14, 2008, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/benjaminbache-the-fight-for-a-free-press; Gordon T. Belt, The Sedition Act of 1798, FIRST AMENDMENT
CTR.,
at
2,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/Sedition_Act_cases.pdf.
193. ROSENFIELD, supra note 190, at 169.
194. Belt, supra note 192, at 2.
195. WOOD, supra note 172, at 260.
196. Id.
197. Id. This included prosecutions of four of the five most influential Republican
journalistic publications. STONE, supra note 161, at 48, 63; Stone Civil Liberties in Wartime,
supra note 172, at 217 (“[T]he Sedition Act was vigorously enforced, but only against
supporters of the Republican party.”).
198. See SIMON P. NEWMAN, PARADES AND THE POLITICS OF THE STREET: FESTIVE CULTURE
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 176 (2010); Bradburn, supra note 159, at 578
199. See, e.g., FRANK N, MAGILL, THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES: DICTIONARY OF WORLD
BIOGRAPHY, VOL. IV 19 (2013); Jeffrey L. Pasley, Alien and Sedition Acts, in CONSPIRACY
THEORIES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 54 (Peter Knight, ed., 2003); Gary D.
Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian
Ascendency, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 939–41
(1992).
200. See JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIES 46–47 (2000); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 123–24 (1984) (“This act could have hardly

POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW

134

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

[Vol. 31:107

and fears about safety from harm that swept the country at the outset
of the “quasi-war” with France dissolved relatively quickly, replaced
by what seemed to be a renewed interest in preserving personal
liberties.201
Reading these tea leaves of public opinion, Jefferson and the
Democratic-Republicans made governmental respect for freedom of
expression and other civil liberties a central plank in their campaigns
for the elections in 1800.202 After a bitterly contested fight for the
White House, Jefferson emerged victorious, and the DemocraticRepublicans succeeded in winning a majority of congressional seats as
well.203 When the Sedition Act expired, Congress refused to renew
it.204 Jefferson pardoned individuals who were convicted under that
law, and ceased virtually all pending Sedition Act prosecutions.205 The
House of Representatives even went as far as impeaching Justice
Samuel Chase, a Federalist who had advocated for the Sedition Act’s
passage and used it zealously from the bench.206
Of course, just as the Sedition Act’s passage owed much to the
Federalist Party’s political strategies, the subsequent hasty recoil from
this law’s restrictions almost certainly arose from the DemocraticRepublican Party’s efforts to curry favor from voters.207 Still, the fact
remains that despite their stark immediate post-revolutionary retreat
away from defending free speech and expression, the United States
succeeded in reversing course surprisingly quickly.208 This shift created
been a starker instance of self-serving politics . . . . [U]ndoubtedly, this Federalist talk of
internal enemies was not more than poor camouflage for a measure favoring incumbency.”);
MAGILL, supra note 199, at 19.
201. See STONE, supra note 161, at 71 (“The net effect of the act had been to ‘stir up a nest
of hornets.’”).
202. See e.g., SUSAN DUNN, JEFFERSON’S SECOND REVOLUTION: THE ELECTION OF 1800
AND THE TRIUMPH OF REPUBLICANISM 145 (2004).
203. SMITH, supra note 186. In addition to Jefferson’s presidential victory, the
Democratic-Republicans came away controlling 103 seats in the House of Representatives and
twenty-five seats in the Senate, compared to just thirty-nine Federalist seats in the House and
nine seats in the Senate. Id. at n.40.
204. Gibson, supra note 185, at 275.
205. Id.
206. Id.; BAILEY STONE, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE AND RUSSIA 200, 209, 221 (2013).
207. See e.g., John Lauritz Larson, Jefferson’s Union and the Problem of Internal
Improvements, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 353 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993); DUNN, supra note
202, at 145.
208. See supra notes 199–207 and accompanying text,; see also Burt Neuborne, The Role
of Courts in Time of War, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 570 (2005) (“The Alien
and Sedition Acts were repudiated at the polls in the election of 1800.”).
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a considerably stronger climate of preserving these freedoms that
remained largely unblemished in the United States until at least the
American Civil War, an atmosphere that continues to be a significant
presence in American political debates today.209
B. France
Despite the ferocious nationwide violence that erupted after the
storming of the Bastille, the French monarchy remained in power after
the initial struggles of the French Revolution.210 Overall, the
revolutionaries seemed to accept the new National Assembly, along
with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, as signals
that the government would meet their demands.211
Yet the
revolutionary leaders also desired a written constitution, a single
document that clearly articulated the rights of French citizens.212
Indeed, a Constitutional Committee with representatives from the three
estates had existed in various forms since the day that the Bastille fell
to the people.213
By the autumn of 1791, this Committee had approved a written
constitution that would govern the post-revolutionary nation.214
Reluctantly, King Louis XVI agreed to recognize it and abide by its
terms, drastically reducing the monarch’s authority over the French
people.215 The drafters incorporated the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen into the preamble of the document, reaffirming
the revolutionary fervor for guaranteeing freedom of speech and

209. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 185, at 271–72, 276; STONE, supra note 161, at 73–76.
The issues that the Sedition Act raised throughout the young United States remain a fertile
source for discussion and debate in the twenty-first century United States, particularly after
the federal measures that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For a sampling
of some recent works on the same basic issues that surrounded the Sedition Act debates, see
generally, SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
(2011); OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (2009); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY,
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
210. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 65–67, 276.
211. See supra Part I.B.
212. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156.
213. See generally MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS, THE REMAKING OF FRANCE: THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791 50 (2002).
214. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156–58. This marked
the first written constitution ever to govern France. See HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 212.
215. MARGARET R. O’LEARY, FORGING FREEDOM: THE LIFE OF CERF BERR OF
MEDELSHEIM 318–20 (2012).
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expression, petition, assembly, and other individual liberties.216
Separation of powers among the National Assembly, the king and his
court, and the judiciary formed the backbone of the new governmental
plan.217 The old feudal system and the ancient traditions of the
monarchy had little place within this constitution’s framework.218
Still, the document contained some surprises. The constitution
drew a division between “active citizens”—the nation’s more affluent
property-holders—and the financially poorer “passive citizens.”219 All
women in France were classified as “passive citizens.”220 Only
individuals whose tax payments surpassed a certain threshold were
permitted to vote in elections.221 These restrictions hearkened back to
some of the old regime’s policies, angering revolutionaries who
wanted the freedoms on the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen to apply to all people, regardless of their financial wealth.222
Complicating matters further, France engaged in a war against
Austria in the spring of 1792.223 Amid this chaos, new political factions
formed and sought to achieve popularity among the people.224 Finding
the greatest success was the Jacobin Club, the most radical and
egalitarian-minded political organization in France at that time.225 Any
club member who ever spoke against any principle of the Declaration
216. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 156.
217. See Mary Denis O’Grady, Master’s Thesis, The Theory of Separation of Powers as
Expressed
in
the
French
Constitution
if
1791,
Paper
795
(1948),
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1797&context=luc_theses; see also
Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1989)(quoting the
Declaration: “‘any society in which rights are not guaranteed, or in which the separation of
powers is not defined, has no constitution[.]’”) (“French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen, art. 16.”).
218. However, the new constitution did define the king as a representative of the nation,
even though the king was never elected by the people and thus had no direct legitimacy to the
citizenry. HOWARD G. BROWN, WAR, REVOLUTION, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE: POLITICS
AND ARMY ADMINISTRATION IN FRANCE, 1791-1799 16 (1995).
219. JAMES R. LEHNING, TO BE A CITIZEN: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE EARLY FRENCH
THIRD REPUBLIC 23 (2001); Giovanna Procacci, Poor Citizens: Social Citizenship Versus
Individualization of Welfare, in CITIZENSHIP, MARKETS, AND THE STATE 52 (Colin Crouch et
al. eds., 2001).
220. MIM KELBER, WOMEN AND GOVERNMENT: NEW WAYS TO POLITICAL POWER (1994).
221. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 158.
222. See, e.g., C. J. MITCHELL, THE FRENCH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF 1791 111 (1988).
223. CHARLES ESDAILE, THE FRENCH WARS 1792–1815 4 (2002).
224. See generally Alison Patrick, Political Divisions in the French National Convention,
1792-93, 41 J. MODERN HIST. 421–74 (1969) (describing the increasingly strident breaks
among emerging political factions during this time period in France).
225. For a good summary of the Jacobin Club and its influence over the French citizenry,
see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS, supra note 52, at 361–66.
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of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was instantly expelled from
the organization.226 Ironically, the group that spoke so highly about
equal rights and freedoms for all routinely persecuted its own members
for speech and expression that did not advance the Jacobin Club’s
gains.227
In August 1792, the revolutionaries arrested Louis XVI and his
queen, Marie Antoinette.228 In September, the National Convention
(which replaced the National Assembly as France’s new legislative
organ) voted to abolish the monarchy entirely, proclaiming “the new
France” to be a republic.229 Four months after that, Louis XVI was
tried by the National Convention for treason and condemned to
death.230 That autumn, Queen Marie Antoinette died on the guillotine
as well.231
The removal of the monarchy created a power vacuum atop the
French government’s food chain.232 To avoid total bedlam, the
National Convention established a twelve-member Committee of
Public Safety, placing almost total control in their hands.233 At first,
the Committee seemed to focus on preserving and enlarging the rights
of the French citizenry, drafting a new written constitution that
incorporated and enlarged the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen in June 1793. Leaders of the National Convention insisted
that the people themselves would retain the right to vote for or against
226. Id. at 363–64.
227. PATRICE L. R. HIGONNET, GOODNESS BEYOND VIRTUE, JACOBINS DURING THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 70 (1998).
228. CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 30.
229. A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 43, at 447–48.The National
Convention emerged during the upheaval of August 1792 with three stated purposes:
temporarily governing France, deciding the fate of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, and
drafting a new constitution in which a bona fide republic would replace the constitutional
monarchy that exited under the current constitutional structure. Id. at 448.
230. Joel Felix, Monarchy, in HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at
56.
231. CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 38. Many French citizens, however, were displeased by
the executions of the king and queen, arguing that the revolutionary leaders should have
reached a more moderate solution while still ensuring freedom for the people. See, e.g.,
WALTON, supra note 45, at 130.
232. Under the Constitution of 1791, the king served as the center of the government’s
executive branch. See BROWN, supra note 218, at 16. With the king gone and the monarchy
abolished completely, the center of power in the French government was abruptly vacant, with
no immediate legal plan of succession in place.
233. See generally R.R. PALMER, TWELVE WHO RULED: THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC
SAFETY DURING THE TERROR (1941) (describing the creation of the Committee of Public Safety
and its rapid ascent to a position of absolute power in France).
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this proposed plan of government, giving the people a level of power
that they had not held in the formation of the previous constitution.234
Political participation among the populace swelled to unprecedented
levels, with an overwhelming majority of citizens voting in favor of
enacting the Constitution of 1793.235
Just a few months later, however, the Committee of Public Safety
declared that the new constitution would be suspended indefinitely, as
France was still in an emergency situation of revolution.236 Leading
the Committee at the time of this decision was Maximilien
Robespierre, one of the staunchest radicals of the Jacobin Club.237 A
devoted reader of Rousseau’s philosophical treatises, Robespierre was
a lawyer who joined the revolutionary effort as a man who
sympathized with the poor and opposed the death penalty.238 He
became president of the Jacobin faction in 1790, serving as a drafter of
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.239 Evidently,
he also reversed his stance on the death penalty, vigorously speaking
out in favor of Louis XVI’s execution.240
With Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety in charge,
freedom of expression became virtually non-existent in France.241
Without strictly limiting speech and expression to prevent subversive
or immoral commentary, Robespierre believed that the French
government could never again maintain any semblance of authority
over the general public.242 The people were desperate, he argued,
leaving no choice but to use desperate measures to gain control.243
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (“The government of the Republic will be revolutionary until the peace.”); see
also MICHAEL L. KENNEDY, THE JACOBIN CLUBS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1793–1795 53
(2000).
237. See KENNEDY, supra note 236, at 54.
238. PALMER, supra note 233, at 6–7.
239. Maximilien
Robespierre:
1758-1794,
BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/robespierre_maximilien.shtml (last visited
March 26, 2016).
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., WALTON, supra note 45, at 129.
242. See, e.g., LYNN AVERY HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE AND CLASS IN THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION 46 (1984) (“The Terror was an emanation of virtue for Robespierre and the other
radicals, because it was required for the security of the new republic.”).
243. Id. This seemed to be a tremendous ideological reversal for Robespierre, who had
declared his devotion to governance by the popular will during discussions regarding the
Constitution of 1793, requesting a meeting place large enough to hold twelve thousand
spectators to ensure that “the general will, the voice of reason, and the public interest [would]
be heard.” Id. at 85.
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Seizing upon the fact that France historically recognized a crime of
calumny, or injurious speech, Robespierre oversaw enactment and
enforcement of new statutes punishing individuals for forms of speech
and expression that the Committee considered “treachery.”244 Perhaps
the most restrictive of all of them was The Law of Suspects, which
imposed penalties upon any people who, “by their conduct or their
relationships, by their conversation or by their writing, [were] shown
to be partisans of tyranny and federalism and the enemies of
freedom.”245
Between 1793 and 1794, tens of thousands of French citizens
were executed on the guillotine or died in prison for their allegedly
disloyal remarks, writings, or other expressions and actions, judged
with impunity by the Committee of Public Safety.246 Today, historians
refer to this gruesome period as the Reign of Terror.247 Interestingly,
though, Robespierre was not completely callous about what he and his
followers were doing.248 At least once, he even said that postrevolutionary leaders should try to extend rights of free expression
rather than chilling this freedom.249 Yet he viewed the use of terror
against people believed to harbour anti-government sentiments as
grisly means of accomplishing a virtuous end.250 “It has been said that
terror is the principle of despotic government,” he told the National
Convention. “Does your government therefore resemble despotism?
Yes, as the sword that gleams in the hands of the heroes of liberty
resembles that with which the henchmen of tyranny are armed.”251
According to his professed beliefs, being a heavy-handed censor,
inquisitor, and punisher now would ultimately lead to the forging a far

244. WALTON, supra note 45, at 133.
245. IAN DONNACHIE & CARMEN LAVIN, FROM ENLIGHTENMENT TO ROMANTICISM,
ANTHOLOGY I 93 (2003); WALTON, supra note 45, at 133–34.
246. RICHARD BULLIET ET AL., THE EARTH AND ITS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL HISTORY 491 (5th
ed. 2011) [hereinafter THE EARTH AND ITS PEOPLES]. For an account of the Committee’s secret
meetings during which many of these judgments were rendered, as well as the power that these
twelve Committee members wielded over France at this time, see PALMER, supra note 233, at
4–6.
247. RICHARD BULLIET ET AL, supra note 246, at 491.
248. See DONNACHIE & LAVIN, supra note 245, at 98; see e.g., WALTON, supra note 45, at
135.
249. WALTON, supra note 45, at 135 (“As Robespierre admitted in May 1791, revolutions
were not ideal moments for extending free speech, for too many people harbored grudges for
the calumnies spread by the free press. (He believed nonetheless that it was important to try).”).
250. See, e.g., HUNT, supra note 242, at 46.
251. CONNOLLY, supra note 43, at 39.
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more stable society.252
In the end, the man who ordered so many executions on the basis
of mere suspicions ultimately found himself at the receiving end of
such treatment.253 After living the last year of his life wrapped in
paranoia, rarely even leaving his house, was arrested and executed by
guillotine in the summer of 1794.254
Still, the effects of the Reign of Terror on the population
lingered.255 Within a five-year period, France had changed from a
revolutionary society that seemed committed to permitting freedom of
expression and other individual right to a land of suppression,
suspicion, violence, and fear.256 It would take some time for this deeply
rooted atmosphere to begin shifting to the far more favorable free
expression climate that exists in France in the present day.257
C. Russia
When Czar Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto, much of the
Russian population erupted in celebration.258 Their revolutionary
movement had not succeeded in toppling the existing regime, but many
of the individuals calling for change at that time were looking for
systemic reform, not full removal of the czar.259 Achieving the
252. See id. (“Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders
of the Republic.”). This viewpoint, however, was not necessarily uniform within the
individuals in political power at this time, or even within the Jacobins themselves.
253. Maximilien Robespierre, supra note 239.
254. See PALMER, supra note 233, at 367, 381.
255. Contrary to what many people asserted at the time, Robespierre’s execution did not
by itself end the Reign of Terror and the laws of censorship and persecution that developed
during that time. The movement away from that short but traumatic period in French history
took considerably longer. See Laura Mason, Thermidor and the Myth of Rapture, in
HANDBOOK OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 51, at 521–33.
256. For a review of this transformation, compare supra Part I .B, with supra Part II.B.
See also Stephen Clay, The White Terror: Factions, Reactions, and the Politics of Vengeance,
in A COMPANION TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, supra note 43, at 359–74 (discussing the
various reactions, including a backlash of violence by a segment of the population against
individuals associated with Robespierre and the Committee, in the aftermath of Robespierre’s
demise).
257. Recently, questions about freedom of speech in France arose following the Charlie
Hedbo attacks in Paris. See, e.g., Paul Kirby, Paris Attacks: France Grapples with Freedom
of Speech, BBC (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-30829005; Jonathan
Turley, The Biggest Threat to French Free Speech Isn’t Terrorism. It’s The Government,
WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-it-means-tostand-with-charlie-hebdo/2015/01/08/ab416214-96e8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html.
258. See supra Part I.C.
259. Even the petition that the workers attempted to present to the czar on Bloody Sunday
never asked for the czar to abdicate the throne. Instead, it called only for the czar to allow
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promises within the October Manifesto appeared to encapsulate
enough victories to satisfy them.260 To these revelers, this day
represented a pivot point in their lives, the moment when they began
to gain some bona fide control over their social, economic, and
political destinies.261
Yet some people remained skeptical about the prospects for
change. “Does [the czar] promise [any reforms] of his own good will?
Or with a pure heart?” asked Marxist theorist Leon Trotsky rhetorically
during an address in 1905. Later in his speech, Trotsky answered his
own question: “It is this tireless hangman on the throne whom we have
forced to promise us freedom.”262
Ultimately, the fears of Trotsky and the other skeptics proved to
be justified. Despite his myriad of promises to improve civil liberties
and economic opportunities for the citizenry, Nicholas II quickly felt
“sick with shame at this betrayal of the dynasty.”263 It soon became
apparent that the czar had no desire to relinquish his autocratic rule and
grant more freedoms to the people. Even on the day of the October
Manifesto’s publication, the celebratory mood was tempered in many
communities where police officers violently shut down peaceful
meetings and protests.264 During the next three days, 690 documented
instances of government-sponsored violence against Russian subjects
occurred in 660 towns and villages across the empire.265
Many Russian revolutionaries believed that the greatest
opportunity for reform came from the Duma, the popularly elected
legislature that Nicholas II promised in the October Manifesto.266
Installing people who would represent the average citizen’s interests
greater freedoms for his subjects. Petition Prepared for Presentation to Nicholas II, January
9, 1905, supra note 75.
260. HOSKING, supra note 91, at 29; PIPES, supra note 70, at 45.
261. See, e.g., STEVE PHILLIPS, LENIN AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 10–11 (2000);
FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 33–34.
262. GERALD SURH, 1905 IN ST. PETERSBURG: LABOR, SOCIETY, AND REVOLUTION 338
(1989).
263. Pyotr Stolypin—A Summary, HISTORY IN AN HOUR (Sept. 18, 2013),
http://www.historyinanhour.com/2013/09/18/pyotr-stolypin-summary. See also PIPES, supra
note 70, at 44 (“Before retiring [on the day when he signed the October Manifesto], Nicholas
wrote in his diary: ‘After such a day, the head has grown heavy and thoughts have become
confused. May the Lord help us save and pacify Russia.’”).
264. Viktoriya Khiterer, The October 1905 Pogrom in Kiev, 22 E. EUROPEAN JEWISH
AFFAIRS 21, 21 (1992).
265. Id.
266. See, e.g., ASCHER, supra note 81, at 36.
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in this legislative body instilled hope of actually realizing the czar’s
October Manifesto pledges of free speech, assembly, and multiple
other individual liberties.267 When elections for seats in the Duma
occurred without any notable government interference, this
widespread level of anticipation rose even higher.268
Before the Duma actually convened, however, Nicholas II
promulgated the Fundamental Laws of Russia, a document that would
serve as Russia’s new constitution.269 At first glance, the Fundamental
Laws appeared to be largely the same as the October Manifesto. It
contained strong language guaranteeing freedom of speech and
renouncing past practices of state-ordered censorship.270 It legalized
political parties and trade unions, entities that received no legal
protection from the Russian government before 1905.271 It recognized
freedom of association and freedom of conscience for all Russian
citizens.272
Closer examination, however, revealed important contrasts
between the October Manifesto and the Fundamental Laws. For
instance, the Fundamental Laws granted the czar power to dissolve the
Duma at any time, leaving the popularly elected legislature living in
fear of the czar’s actions.273 No bill could become a law without the
czar’s approving signature.274 During periods when the Duma was not
in session, the czar had complete decision-making authority for
Russia.275 The power to declare war or enter into a peace agreement
rested unilaterally with the czar.276 Overall, the message was blunt.
Russia had a popularly elected legislature now, but the czar was still
267. See id. For a brief period after signing the October Manifesto, Czar Nicholas II and
his advisors even permitted the Russian people an unprecedented degree of freedom, including
a vast increase of liberty of speech and expression. Id. at 40.
268. The new electoral system excluded many Russians from voting, including women
and domestic servants. HOSKING, supra note 91, at 427. However, two heavily populated social
classes in Russia—peasants and factory workers—were now permitted to vote. Id.
269. JENNIFER SIEGEL, FOR PEACE AND MONEY: FRENCH AND BRITISH FINANCE IN THE
SERVICE OF TSARS AND COMMISSARS 89 (2014).
270. See PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 70 (Levent
Gönenç ed., 2002).
271. Id.; FITZPATRICK, supra note 70, at 35.
272. PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, supra note
270, at 70.
273. SIEGEL, supra note 269, at 89.
274. PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, supra note
270, at 70.
275. SIEGEL, supra note 269, at 89.
276. Id.
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the nation’s ultimate holder of power.277 “To obey [the czar’s]
authority, not only through fear but for the sake of conscience, is
ordered by God himself,” the new constitution proclaimed.278
When the Duma opened its first session in April 1906, reasons for
optimism once more quickly vanished.279 The majority of its members
called for a series of new measures: greater rights of expression and
association for trade unions, the release of political prisoners, and land
reform.280 Most notably of all, the Duma requested that the czar yield
more power to the legislature, transforming Russia from an autocracy
into a constitutional monarchy.281 Instead of agreeing to any of these
reforms, however, Nicholas II decided to take the opposite approach.
In July 1906, after the legislative body had remained in session for just
forty-two days, the czar dissolved the Duma entirely.282
In February 1907, the Second Duma convened.283 Once again, its
members recommended passage of several reforms, and once again,
Nicholas II dismissed the legislators.284 To avoid facing such
recommendations again, Nicholas II used his power of ruling by decree
when the Duma was out of session to enact new election laws that were
drafted by his prime minister, Peter Stolypin.285 These provisions
disenfranchised a sizeable portion of the Russian population, reserving
the greatest number of votes for Russia’s richest landowners.286
Consequently, the composition of the Third Duma and the Fourth
Duma included considerably more conservative, pro-government
members than the previous two Dumas.287 At the outset of World War
277. Czar Nicholas II made no secret of this fact, either, even telling his Minister of War,
“I created the Duma, not to be directed by it, but to be advised.” PIPES, supra note 70, at 154.
278. This language appeared in Article 4 of the Fundamental Laws. Article 5 went on to
state that the czar was “sacred and inviolable.” THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES AT WAR,
1914–1918 358 (Herbert Francis Wright ed., 1919).
279. EDWARD ACTON, RUSSIA: THE TSARIST AND SOVIET LEGACY 121 (2014); SIEGEL,
supra note 269, at 89.
280. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY 142 (2006); PETER OXLEY, RUSSIA, 1855–1991: FROM TSARS TO COMMISSARS 68
(2001).
281. See EDWARD ACTON, RUSSIA: THE TSARIST AND SOVIET LEGACY 121 (2014); SIEGEL,
supra note 269, at 89.
282. SIEGEL, supra note 269, at 89; ASCHER, supra note 81, at 47; BERTRAND RUSSELL,
PROPHECY AND DISSENT, 1914–16, at 246 (1988) (“With [the First Duma’s] dissolution, the
successful period of the Russian Revolution came to an end.”).
283. ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 280, at 142.
284. JONATHAN BROMLEY, RUSSIA 1848–1917, at 106 (2002).
285. Id. at 106–08.
286. Id. at 107.
287. See id.
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I, the Duma voted to officially support Nicholas II and his advisors,
and to dissolve itself until the war’s end.288 Deputies who voted against
the czar on this issue were subsequently arrested.289
Stolypin held little regard for delivering on the promises of
freedom of expression contained in the October Manifesto and, to a
lesser extent, the Fundamental Laws. Under his oversight, individuals
who were suspected of speaking or writing against the czar could be
imprisoned, exiled, or even killed.290 Between 1906 and 1909 alone,
2,694 Russians were sentenced to death.291
Surprisingly, the total number of newspapers in Russia actually
increased slightly during this same time period, rising from
approximately 602 Russian-language newspapers in 1908 to 972
Russian-language newspapers by 1914.292 However, with the
substantial powers derived from the Fundamental Laws at his
disposal—including Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, a provision
permitting the government to circumvent the legislature entirely in
“emergency” situations—Stolypin wielded his authority to eradicate
real and perceived dissenters.293 He justified such measures as
necessary to prevent chaos and disorder.294 “[W]hen in danger, the
state must revert to the most rigorous, the most exceptional measures
in order to avoid disintegration,” Stolypin declared in one address to
the Duma. “This was, this is, and this will be so always and
everywhere. . . . [T]he government came to the conclusion that the
country expects from it a demonstration not of weakness but of
faith.”295
Eventually, the various negative pressures of this era boiled over
in another revolution. In October 1917, the Russian revolutionaries
overthrew the czarist regime, and Vladimir Lenin seized full control of
288. COMPETING VOICES FROM THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, supra note 70, at 15.
289. See ADAM B. ULAM, STALIN: THE MAN AND HIS ERA 125 (2007).
290. See, e.g., HELEN RAPPAPORT, CONSPIRATOR: LENIN IN EXILE 144–45 (2012).
291. Alexander N. Domrin, A Lost War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons of the Russian
Empire, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 63, 86 (2010). In those three years, more Russians received a
death sentence than were executed in the vast nation’s entire history. Id.
292. WALTER G. MOSS, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA, VOLUME 2: SINCE 1855, at 125 (2005).
293. See, e.g., Steven L. Hoch, Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of
Renewal in Russia by Peter Waldron, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 462, 462–63 (2000); PIPES, supra
note 70, at 170.
294. See PIPES, supra note 70, at 170 (“Because he believed in the rule of law, he regretted
having to [govern by decree], but he saw no alternative: such procedures were ‘a deplorable
necessity’ justified on the grounds that at times the interests of the state took precedence.”).
295. Domrin, supra note 291, at 89.
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the nation.296 His Communist ideals of a classless society where people
took only what they needed and contributed according to their
individual abilities appealed to a population that had spent too long
stuck in poor economic conditions.297 Yet the notions of freedom of
speech and expression seemed to be lost in the shuffle of this uprising.
Such liberties were never part of Lenin’s message to the people.298
“Everyone is free to write and say whatever he likes, without any
restriction,” he stated. “But every voluntary association (including the
[Communist] Party) is also free to expel members who use the name
of the Party to advocate anti-Party views.299
Yet it was a different alleged comment that may have provided
the most emblematic declaration of where freedom of speech and
expression stood after Lenin assumed governance of Russia.
“Freedom of speech?” he apparently asked incredulously soon after
taking office. “We are not going to commit suicide.”300
D. Cuba
In 1959, Fidel Castro’s speech to the assembled masses at
Cospedes Park instilled hope for restorations of traditional Cuban
freedoms lost under the Batista dictatorship.301 In that address, Castro
emphasized the importance of freedom of expression, stating that
anyone—even critics of his government—could express their
viewpoints publically at any time without fear of state-sponsored
censure.302 The fact that Castro went to such lengths in this oration to
discuss freedom of expression provided many Cubans with an
overwhelming sense of hope that Castro would preserve the individual
liberties described in the Constitution of 1940.303
Just two years later, however, Castro addressed the Cuban people
296. ROBERT SERVICE, A HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA 26 (2013) (“Lenin became the
country’s ruler within months of tsarism’s overthrow.”).
297. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 261, at 123.
298. At least as early as 1905, Lenin was advocating for complete Party regulation of
literature, and total Party control over works of “science, philosophy, and aesthetics.” ERIKA
GOTTLIEB, DYSTOPIAN FICTION EAST AND WEST: UNIVERSE OF TERROR AND TRIAl 121 (2001).
299. V. I. LENIN: 10 COLLECTED WORKS 47 (Andrew Rothstein, trans. & ed., Moscow,
Progress Publisher 2010) (1905), http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/Lenin%20CWVol.%2010.pdf.
300. Prominent
Russians:
Vladimir
Lenin,
RUSSIPEDIA,
http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/leaders/vladimir-lenin/.
301. See FIDEL CASTRO READER, supra note 122, at 107.
302. See supra Part I.D.
303. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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with remarks that carried a far different message. On its face, this
speech was directed toward Cuba’s “intellectuals,” the artists and
writers who demanded to know precisely how much dissent Castro
would tolerate.304 Castro began this address by promising to
safeguarding the liberty of all Cuban citizens and condemning the
Batista government for failing to do so.305 About halfway through his
remarks, however, the revolutionary leader began changing course,
stating:
The Revolution must understand that [not everyone in Cuba
supports its aims], and consequently must act in such a way that the
entire sector of artists and intellectuals who are not genuinely
revolutionary find a place to work and to create within the Revolution,
and so that their creative spirit will have an opportunity and freedom
for expression within the Revolution, even though they are not
revolutionary writers or artists. This means that within the Revolution,
everything goes; against the Revolution, nothing. Nothing against the
Revolution, because the Revolution has its rights also, and the first
right of the Revolution is its right to exist, and no one can stand against
the right of the Revolution to be and to exist . . . since it takes in the
interests of the people and signifies the existence of the entire nation.306
These words departed dramatically from Castro’s initial promises
of absolute freedom of expression for all people, including critics of
the government.307 With this new statement, Castro had changed the
playing field, declaring that the only statements from artists and writers
protected from government suppression were works that advanced the
revolutionary state’s purposes and aims.308 Counterpoints in writing or
artwork that criticized Castro’s government and proposed alternative
programs, reforms, or structures of governance would now receive no
legal protection whatsoever.309

304. See Fidel Castro’s Speech to Intellectuals on 30 June 1961, Castro Speech Data Base,
http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1961/19610630.html.
305. Id. (“In the first place, permit me to tell you that the Revolution defends freedom . . .
that because of its essence, the Revolution cannot be an enemy of freedoms, and that if anyone
fears that the Revolution is
going to stifle his creative spirit, that Concern is unnecessary and has no reason for being.”).
306. Id.
307. Compare supra text accompanying notes 121–123, with supra Part II.D.
308. Castro’s Speech to Intellectuals, supra note 304 (“I believe this is quite clean. What
are the rights of revolutionary or non-revolutionary writers and artists? Within the revolution,
everything [;] against the revolution, no rights at all.”).
309. See id.
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Yet Castro was not done. “This will not be any law of exception
for writers and artists,” he continued. “This will be a general principle
for all citizens. It is a basic principle of the Revolution.
Counterrevolutionaries—that is, the enemies of the Revolution—have
no right against the Revolution, because the Revolution has a right: the
right to exist, the right to develop, and the right to win.”310 Then, a few
minutes later, he delivered his definitive statement on this topic: “The
rights of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison
with the rights of that people.”311
By the end of this address, a new reality had descended upon all
Cubans listening to their new leader’s remarks. Contrary to his
revolutionary promises, Castro had now made it clear that he would
not tolerate any speech or expression from any Cuban citizen
criticizing or questioning the revolution.312 By extension, since Castro
himself was the face of the revolution, and now the leader of the postrevolutionary Cuban nation, no forms of expression against Castro and
his allies would receive any protection under Cuban law.313
These remarks in 1961 accurately foreshadowed Cuba’s future
under Castro’s leadership. Building upon his immense popularity
following the overthrow of Batista, Castro quickly consolidated all
governmental power under his new Partido Comunista Cubano
(Cuban Communist Party), installing himself at the helm of the
government.314 This was the start of a one-party regime that dominated
Cuba under Castro’s leadership, ultimately proving to be as intolerant
of countervailing views as the Batista dictatorship that Castro had
demolished.315
During his campaigns as a revolutionary, Castro had repeatedly
promised to restore the Constitution of 1940 to protect fundamental
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. TED HENKEN, CUBA: A GLOBAL STUDIES HANDBOOK 94 (2008).
315. See, e.g., ANDRES J. SOLARES, CUBA: THE DISASTER OF CUBA’S REVOLUTION 87–89
(2010); KATHERINE FORD, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN CUBAN AND ARGENTINE THEATER 28–29
(2010) (focusing on state-imposed censorship of theatre and other forms of artistic expression
under Castro’s regime in post-revolutionary Cuba); JONATHAN GREEN & NICHOLAS J.
KAROLIDES, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CENSORSHIP 132–33 (2009); Roger Reed, Censorship in
Castro’s Cuba: ‘Against the Revolution, Nothing’, in PATTERNS OF CENSORSHIP AROUND THE
WORLD 67 (Ilan Peleg, ed., 1993); Carlos Ripoll, The Press in Cuba, 1952–1960:
Authoritarian and Totalitarian Censorship, in THE SELLING OF FIDEL CASTRO: THE MEDIA AND
THE CUBAN REVOLUTION 83 (William E. Ratliff, ed., 1987).
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freedoms of all Cuban citizens.316 As a prime minister, however, he
backed away from constitutional reform.317 Consequently, Cuba
existed without a constitution for sixteen years.318 Lacking a written
plan of government, Castro and the Communist Party installed laws by
issuing decrees on an ad hoc basis.319
Amid this climate of unfettered power, the Castro administration
systematically eliminated sources of actual or potential dissent.320 The
government closed independent print and broadcast media outlets,
replacing them with multiple state-controlled newspapers, radio
programs, and television stations.321 A Cuban news agency soon
emerged as the largest such agency in the developing world,
establishing more than thirty offices worldwide to spread Castro’s
approved messages.322 Castro himself became a frequent editorialist in
the government-run newspapers, particularly the state-sponsored daily
paper Granma.323 Frequently, Castro would arrive unannounced at the
Granma offices, painstakingly dictating matters as minute as where to
place certain stories for the next day’s edition.324
Chief among these new methods of expression control was the
Committee of Revolutionary Orientation, charged with ensuring that
316. Kemper, supra note 115; CHOMSKY, supra note 99, at 37.
317. Reed, supra note 315, at 67; Ripoll, supra note 315, at 94–95.
318. Instead of a constitution, Castro enacted a “Fundamental Law” with one central
purpose: to grant himself complete control over the Cuba.. Under this Fundamental Law, many
civil liberties and political rights that the Constitution of 1940 had guaranteed to Cuban
citizens evaporated completely. Jonathan Wachs, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution:
Arguments for Social and Economic Rights in a Post-Castro Government, 10 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 525, 545–46 (1996).
319. Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Jan.
28, 2011, at 4; ARON T. ULRICH, FOCUS ON CUBA: CURRENT ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS 5
(2008).
320. See, e.g., SOLARES, supra note 315, at 87–89; Reed, supra note 315, at 67.
321. See, e.g., THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA 119 (Jario Lugo-Ocando, ed., 2008) (“The
media were nationalized, and by the end of 1960 the whole system was under state control. . . .
[C]ommercial media had become not only ideologically anachronistic, but also economically
unfeasible: all the external trade and most of the internal, the banks . . . and more than a third
of agriculture, were already in the hands of the government.”).
322. NICHOLAS J. CULL, DAVID CULBERT & DAVID WELCH, PROPAGANDA AND MASS
PERSUASION: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1500 TO THE PRESENT 69 (2003).
323. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN CULTURES
668–69 (Daniel Balderston, Mike Gonzalez & Ana M. Lopez, eds.,2002); CULL, CULBERT &
WELCH, supra note 322, at 69; THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA , supra note 321, at 122, 125.
324. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CUBA: CASTRO’S PROPAGANDA APPARATUS
FOREIGN
POLICY
6
(Nov.
1984),
AND
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000972183.
pdf [hereinafter “CIA BRIEF.”].

POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW

2016]

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

FIRST IN, FIRST OUT

149

all Cubans followed the guiding principles of the revolution.325
Overseen by two of Castro’s closest advisors, Antonio Perez Herrero
and Orlando Fundora Lopez, the agency closely supervised every
aspect of Cuban public life.326 In doing so, it became the engine from
which Castro’s propaganda machine ran, with the government using
various measures—including threats, intimidation, and punishments
from around-the-clock surveillance to criminal prosecutions—to
prevent dissidents’ voices from reaching a widespread audience.327
Anyone who disobeyed Castro’s precepts for the life of “the new
Cuba” was labelled an enemy of the revolution and penalized as a
threat to the security of the Cuban state.328 By 1965, at least twenty
thousand political prisoners were incarcerated in Cuba’s prisons and
jails.329
Within the first decade after Castro assumed power, nearly ten
percent of Cuba’s population had left the country, primarily migrating
to locations within the United States.330 Perhaps motivated in part by
this discontent, and quite likely desiring to codify the principles of “his
revolution,” Castro and his allies began pushing for the creation and
adoption of a formal written constitution.331 Indeed, on February 1976,
a new constitution went into effect, allegedly approved by an
astounding 97.7 percent of all Cuban voters.332
Yet anybody expecting Castro to finally deliver on his promise to
325. HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 154.
326. CIA BRIEF, supra note 324, at 6–7.
327. See HALPERIN, supra note 113, at 154. This body was later renamed the Ideological
Department of the Central Committee, but its basic mission was still the same. THE MEDIA IN
LATIN AMERICA , supra note 321, at 123.
328. See, e.g., ALEXANDER DAWSON, LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: A HISTORY
WITH PRIMARY SOURCES 249 (2014) (“Cubans, [Castro] argued, must unify to confront Cuba’s
internal and external enemies. . . . As he convinced more and more Cubans that a liberated
Cuba depended on his communist Revolution, he was also able to convince many that
opposition amounted to treason.”); DIGITAL CULTURES AND THE POLITICS OF EMOTION:
FEELINGS, AFFECT, AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 199 (Athina Karatzogianni & Adi Kuntsman,
eds., 2012) (“Protecting the Revolution from its enemies must therefore serve as a hard limit
to freedom of expression in Cuba.”); ROBERT E. QUIRK, FIDEL CASTRO 411—13 (1995).
329. CUBAN COMMUNISM 673 (8th ed., Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., 1995). This number is
likely quite low, as Castro himself released this estimate through his state-controlled media
outlets. ID. However, even this likely underestimated figure still represents a high ratio of
prisoners: more than forty prisoners per 100,000 people in the total populace. ID. Castro
justified this large number of political prisoners by stating that they were enemies of the state,
or “counterrevolutionaries.” See ID.
330. ID. This trend continued after 1969 in significant numbers, with many Cubans
migrating to the State of Florida. See ID. at 26—29.
331. See Sullivan, supra note 319, at 4; Wachs, supra note 318, at 546.
332. Sullivan, supra note 319, at 4.
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restore the Constitution of 1940 would have been vastly disappointed
by this document. The constitution did guarantee a number of valuable
social benefits for all Cubans, including free health care and free
education for all citizens.333 On the other hand, however, the
Constitution of 1976 effectively formalized the censorship and state
control that had become the norm in Cuban everyday life.334 In
particular, Article 53 of the constitution proclaimed:
Citizens have freedom of speech and of the press in keeping with
the objectives of socialist society. Material conditions for the exercise
of that right are provided by the fact that the press, radio, television,
movies and other organs of the mass media are State and social
property and can never be private property. This assures their use at
the exclusive service of the working people and in the interest of
society. The law regulates the exercise of these freedoms.335
Interestingly, Article 54 guaranteed all “working people” the
freedoms of “assembly, demonstration, and association.”336 However,
this apparent advancement in the realm of free expression was vastly
curtailed later in the document. Article 62 opened the door to complete
governmental regulation of all individual liberties by stating:
None of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens can be
exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution and the
law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist State,
or contrary to the existence and objectives of the Socialist state, or
contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and
communism. Violations of this principle can be punished by law.337
Under this framework, the Castro government now had
constitutional authority to unilaterally ban any speech or expression
questioning any professed governmental aim.338 Not surprisingly, the
333. See William T. D’Zurilla, Cuba’s 1976 Socialist Constitution and the Fidelista
Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1223, 1247–48 (1981).
334. Peter T. Johnson, The Nuanced Lives of the Intelligentsia, in ENRIQUE A. BALOYRA
& JAMES A. MORRIS, CONFLICT AND CHANGE IN CUBA 146 (1993).
CONST.
OF
1976,
art.
53,
335. CUBAN
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Cuba%20Constitution.pdf (hereinafter “CONST. OF
1976”).
336. Id. at art. 54.
337. Id. at art. 62. As a reminder of how harsh punishments for violating the objectives of
the Socialist state in Cuba and the commands of the Cuban government, Article 65 read, in
pertinent part: “Treason against one’s country is the most serious of crimes; those who commit
it are subject to the most severe penalties.” Id. at art. 65.
338. See D’Zurilla, supra note 333, at 1253–54.
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regime exercised this power frequently in the years following the new
constitution’s adoption, leading to virtually complete domination of all
speech and expression by the state.339 To this day, backed by this blank
check to prohibit “anti-government” speech and expression, Cuba
remains one of the most heavily censored nations in the world.340
E. Tunisia and Egypt
Of the nations examined within this article, perhaps the hardest to
assess in the free speech and expression context are Tunisia and Egypt.
Only five years have passed since the Arab Spring uprisings in both
nations.341 Consequently, an especially small window of time exists in
which to evaluate the post-revolutionary responses regarding free
speech and expression in both nations, a period far shorter than the
other states discussed here.
However, even within this comparatively small time frame,
several events in both nations demonstrate the now-familiar
phenomenon of governments abridging free speech and expression in
the aftermath of revolutions, despite strong revolutionary sentiments
and promises to the contrary.342 Both nations’ new governments have
engaged in both civil and criminal prosecutions of multiple dissenters
expressing their views peaceably in the media, through forms of visual
art and music, and on the public streets of their communities.343
Concurrently, both nations have developed a climate of considerable
government intrusion into the speech and expression of individuals and
private organizations, demanding compliance with certain state-

339. See, e.g., THE MEDIA IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 321, at 121–22; Reed, supra note
315, at 67.
340. Rick Gladstone, Eritrea and North Korea Are World’s Most Censored Countries,
Advocacy
Group
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
21,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/eritrea-and-north-korea-are-worlds-mostcensored-countries-advocacy-group-says.html?_r=0; Cuba, Iran, China Among 10 Countries
with
Most
Censorship,
CPJ
Says,
FOX
NEWS,
(Apr.
21,
2015),
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2015/04/21/cuba-iran-china-among-10-countrieswith-most-censorship-cpj-says/.
341. Tunisia’s uprising that toppled Ben Ali occurred in January 2011. SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, MOBILIZATION, AND CONTESTATION, supra note 149, at 241. Egypt’s revolt that
forced Mubarak to flee the country occurred in February 2011. Kirkpatrick, supra note 153.
342. For a review of promises demanded by revolutionaries in Tunisia and Egypt, and
promises made by a number of their leaders, see generally supra Part I.E.
343. See, e.g., Charlotte Schriwer, Graffiti Arts and the Arab Spring, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE ARAB SPRING: RETHINKING DEMOCRATIZATION 381 (2014); Andreas
Gorzewski, Post-Arab Spring Censorship on the Rise, DEUTSCHE WELLE, July 4, 2013,
http://www.dw.de/post-arab-spring-censorship-on-the-rise/a-16725701.
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approved positions, objectives, and beliefs.344
Notably, however, both nations have also developed new
constitutions that pay significant attention to protecting freedom of
expression. Article 31 of the constitution that Tunisia ratified in 2014
declares that “[f]reedom of opinion, thought, expression, information
and publication shall be guaranteed.”345 With a nod to the central role
of the Internet and telecommunications in the 2011 revolution, Article
32 guarantees Tunisian citizens “the right to information and the right
of access to information and communication networks.”346 Subsequent
provisions also guarantee the right to academic freedom, the right to
vote, the right to establish political parties and unions, and the right to
assemble in peaceful demonstrations.347
Egypt’s new constitution, also enacted in 2014, likewise provides
strong language regarding freedom of speech and expression. The
leading provision in this area is Article 65, which states: “Freedom of
thought and opinion is guaranteed. Every person shall have the right to
express his/her opinion, verbally, in writing, though imagery, or by any
other means of expression and publication.”348 Articles 66 and 67
protect freedoms of scientific research and artistic expression.349
Article 73 prohibits the state from monitoring peaceful private
meetings, and allows Egyptian citizens to assemble peaceably after
serving the government with proper notice of the intent to
demonstrate.350
Both of these constitutions appear to demonstrate a new
commitment to freedom of speech and expression in these nations. Yet
both plans of government also contain troubling provisions regarding
these individual liberties, too. For instance, Article 1 of the Tunisian
constitution pronounces Islam to be the official religion of Tunisia.351
This gives rise to the question of whether the Tunisian government
344. See, e.g., Joshua Kurlantzick, In the Arab Spring’s Aftermath, Democracy Retreats,
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/democratization/arab-springs-aftermathdemocracy-retreats/p27138.
345. TUNISIA
CONST.
OF
2014,
art.
31,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf.
346. Id. at art. 32.
347. Id. at art. 33, 34, 35, 36 & 37.
348. EGYPT
CONST.
OF
2014,
art.
65,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf.
349. Id. at art. 65 & 66.
350. Id. at art. 73. The Constitution of 2014 calls this the guarantee of “Freedom of
House.” See id.
351. TUNISIA CONST., art. 1.
BUSINESSWEEK
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would utilize this provision to stifle speech and expression that is antiIslamic, questions or objects to certain precepts of Islam, or is deemed
by the government to fly in the face of certain Muslim values.352
Article 6 of this constitution raises further questions by declaring
the state to be “the guardian of religion,” and by proclaiming that the
Tunisian government shall undertake “the protection of the sacred.”353
Again, this seems to open the door for the state to ban or limit speech
and expression on the basis of violating Muslim beliefs.354 Heated
ongoing debates about introducing a Tunisian penal law forbidding
“blasphemy” of “sacred values” underscore the possibility of such
proscriptions.355 Furthering this concern is the language of the second
sentence within Article 31, the provision guaranteeing freedom of
expression for Tunisian citizens. Implicit in the statement that “[t]hese
freedoms shall not be subject to prior censorship” is the possibility—
and perhaps even the likelihood—that the government will engage in
post-publication or post-utterance abridgements of speech and
expression. The continued existence of laws from the Ben Ali regime
allowing the government to punish individuals or groups for
publishing materials deemed harmful to “public morals” prove that this
type of action is far from an impossibility.356

352. From the outset of the post-Arab Spring government, this concern has occupied a
significant place in the minds of both Islamic conservatives and liberal secularists. See, e.g.,
Alexandra Sandels, Tunis Crowds Gather for Anti-Censorship March, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/10/tunisia-freedom-of-expressiondemonstration-elections-islamists-freedom-of-speech-nessma-tv-politics.html.
353. TUNISIA CONST., art. 6.
354. The language of this article appears to deliver the Tunisian government a blank check
to prosecute any form of speech and expression as violating sacred beliefs. Without any
definition of “sacred” or any further structure regarding the state’s role as “guardian of
religion,” the government can wield tremendous power to censor speech and expression on
religious grounds.
355. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, BLASPHEMY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, AND
TUNISIA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2013); Alvin Powell, A Warning From Inside Tunisia,
HARV. GAZETTE, Sept. 18, 2012, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/09/a-warningfrom-inside-tunisia/.Throughout the debates leading up to the enactment of Tunisia’s 2012
and 2014 Constitutions, many Tunisian citizens pushed for a constitutional provision that
specifically forbade blasphemous expression and allowed the government to criminalize such
expression. See SHADI HAMID, TEMPTATIONS OF POWER: ISLAMISTS AND ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST 182 (2014); Antoine Lambroschini, Blasphemy Clause
to Be Dropped from New Tunisian Constitution, Speaker Says, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 12,
2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/blasphemy-clause-to-be-dropped-fromnew-tunisian-constitution-speaker-says/article4608262/.
356. See, e.g., Eric Reidy, Questioning Freedom of Speech in Tunisia, AL JAZEERA, Jan.
30, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/01/questioning-freedom-speech-tunisia150126104509780.html.
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In the new Egyptian constitution, installed after a military coup
toppled the post-Arab Spring president Morsi and replaced him with
military leader Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, substantial questions remain
regarding the government’s interactions with the media.357 Article 70
guarantees freedom of the press for Egyptian citizens.358 However, in
the same breath, it states that the Egyptian government must receive
notification before any publisher can disseminate a newspaper, and
that the state will regulate “procedures of establishing and owning”
television, radio, and Internet media outlets.359 Article 71 allows the
government to suspend or shut down media entities during “times of
war or general mobilization.”360 Such provisions grant the state
significant latitude to monitor and control the media and its messages
to the general public.
Another disconcerting component of the Egyptian constitution
appears within Article 50, a section focusing on “Egypt’s civilization
and cultural heritage, whether physical or moral.” According to the
language within Article 50, any form of “aggression” toward this
physical or moral heritage is a criminal offense.361 Importantly, the
Article does not attempt to define the term “aggression.” Therefore,
an expansive reading of this provision could easily lead to widespread
state censorship of any speech and expression that the government
deems to be “aggression” toward a particular aspect of Egypt’s
physical or moral heritage.362
Just as important as these constitutional words are the actions
occurring in both nations following their revolutions in 2011. Within
short time periods after both Mubarak and Ben Ali were ousted,
citizens in both Egypt and Tunisia were arrested and charged under
laws that prohibited broad categories of speech and expression. For
example, Tunisian rap musician Weld El 15 was sentenced to two
357. See, e.g., Khaled Diab, Egypt’s Freedom of Repression, AL JAZEERA, Dec. 28, 2014,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/egypt-freedom-repression2014122883332498794.html; Sherif Mansour, As al-Sisi Promises Freedom of Speech, TV
Host Youssef Is Put Under Investigation, COMM. FOR PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS, Sept.
2014, https://cpj.org/blog/2014/04/as-al-sisi-promises-freedom-of-speech-satirical-tv.php.
358. EGYPT CONST., art. 70.
359. Id.
360. Id. at art. 71.
361. See EGYPT CONST., art. 71.
362. Once again, the lack of any level of definition is problematic here. Such vague
language could easily allow the Egyptian government to use “aggression” toward Egypt’s
heritage as a pretext for punishing individuals who engage in speech or expression that the
government simply does not like and wants to suppress.
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years in prison for producing a music video in which he called the
police force “dogs.”363 Egyptian television personality Bassem
Youssef was charged multiple times under a statute prohibiting insults
against the president, ultimately ending his show, leaving Egypt, and
travelling to the United States.364 Tunisian television executive Nabil
Karoui was fined for airing a film that included an animation
representing the Muslim prophet Mohammed.365 Egyptian authorities
imprisoned award-winning Al Jazeera journalists Baher Mohamed,
Peter Greste, and Mohamed Fahmy for coverage that allegedly
threatened Egypt’s national security and damaged the nation’s
reputation.366
Many other outspoken individuals suffered the same fate.367
Bloggers, playwrights, visual artists, journalists with various media
outlets, sympathizers with rival political movements, and citizens of
all stripes who engaged in protests or were perceived as dissidents
faced censure and sanctions from the new governments in Egypt and
Tunisia.368 The situation seemed to grow particularly oppressive in
Egypt, where more than 10,000 people were jailed—many of them on
charges relating to speech and expression—between February 2011
and January 2012 alone.369 A tremendous increase in cases for
363. Tarek Amara, Rapper Weld el 15 Gets Two Years in Jail for Calling Police Dogs in
Song, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 22, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/music/news/rapper-weld-el-15-gets-two-years-in-jail-for-calling-police-dogsin-song-8546156.html.
364. Dean Obeidallah, Egypt’s Jon Stewart Comes to America, THE DAILY BEAST, Feb. 9,
2015,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/09/egypt-s-jon-stewart-comes-toamerica.html.
365. Marc Fisher, Tunisian Court Finds Broadcaster Guilty in Showing God’s Image,
WASH. POST (May 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/tunisian-whoshowed-persepolis-on-tv-fined-in-free-speech-case/2012/05/03/gIQA0GpzyT_story.html.
366. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, A Year Later, Al Jazeera Journalists Still Imprisoned in
Egypt, NPR, Dec. 29, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/12/29/373835075/a-year-later-aljazeera-journalists-still-imprisoned-in-egypt; Who are the al-Jazeera Journalists Tried in
Egypt?, BBC, Feb. 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27943387.
367. See Calkins, supra note 131; Diab, supra note 357; Reidy, supra note 356.
368. See, e.g., Tunisian Blogger Sentenced for Defaming Army, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 20, 2015,
8:26
PM)
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/tunisian-blogger-jaileddefaming-army-2015120192721195412.html; Chad Elias, From Street to Screen: Graffiti,
‘New Media’ and the Politics of Images in Post-Mubarak Egypt, in WALLS OF FREEDOM:
STREET ART OF THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 89–91 (2014); Victor Salama, Three Years After
the Arab Spring, Tunisian and Egyptian Musicians Continue to Fight Censorship, GLOBAL
VOICES (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:00 AM) http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/08/29/musiccensorship-in-tunisia-and-egypt/#; Tarek Amara, Tunisian Artists Cry for Help Against
REUTERS
(Sept.
19,
2012,
11:36
AM)
Religious
Extremists,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/us-tunisia-salafi-art-idUSBRE88I0SM20120919.
369. Ironically, this mass imprisonment occurred even after Egypt’s new military regime
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“religious defamation” occurred during the same time period.370 As
one commentator stated about the situation in Egypt, “[E]ven a hint of
sedition can lead to being thrown in jail.”371
In the beginning, one might reasonably suspect that the continued
censorship came at least in part from government officials who were
part of the former regimes but remained in power after the revolutions,
or from laws that simply remained “on the books” in the immediate
turbulence after the old regime ended.372 However, as new leaders
were installed in office and the governmental crackdowns on speech
and expression continued, it became evident that these measures were
more than just a carryover from past practices.373 Indeed, one of the
most recent blows to free speech came in December 2014, when the
Egyptian President al-Sisi announced that he would soon issue a law
criminalizing speech or expression that insulted the January 2011
revolution and the takeover of al-Sisi’s government in June 2013.374
promised to scale back its use of the “emergency laws” so frequently invoked to censor speech
and expression under Mubarak’s rule. See Egypt’s Infamous Emergency Law Expires, AL
(May
31,
2012,
17:20
GMT)
JAZEERA,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/2012531134021732460.html; see also
Huda Badri & Adham Youssef, Egypt is Witnessing Less Freedom of Expression Than Under
Mubarak or Morsi: John R. Bradley, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Aug. 23, 2014),
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/08/23/egypt-witnessing-less-freedom-expressionmubarak-morsi-john-r-bradley/.
370. Gorzewski, supra note 343. One of the toughest challenges to freedom of expression
in post-Arab Spring Egypt comes from criticisms of Islam or advocacy for religions beyond
Islam. See, e.g., James Michael Nossett, Free Exercise After the Arab Spring: Protecting
Egypt’s Religious Minorities Under the Country’s New Constitution, 89 IND. L.J. 1653, 1658,
1683 (2014) (stating that Egyptian law continues to leave speech and expression against Islam
or in favor of other religious beliefs unprotected).
371. Dan Murphy, Egypt’s Constitutional Referendum: It’s Not About Democracy Any
More, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/SecurityWatch/Backchannels/2014/0115/Egypt-s-constitutional-referendum-It-s-not-aboutdemocracy-any-more.-video.
372. For instance, after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Ben Ali’s former Prime Minister Mohamed
Ghannouchi—a man who had held multiple ministerial posts under Ben Ali’s regime since
1989—immediately assumed the role of interim president. Accused of being too close to the
old regime, he ultimately resigned. Kim Willsher, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed
Ghannouchi Resigns Amid Unrest, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2011, 2:58 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/27/tunisian-prime-minister-ghannouchiresigns. In Egypt, after Mubarak stepped down, the top official of the military government was
Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, who “served for decades as a top official of Mr. Mubarak’s
government.” Kirkpatrick, supra note 153.
373. See, e.g., Hend Kortam, Calls for a ‘Religious Revolution’, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan.
13, 2015), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/01/13/calls-religious-revolution.
374. Sonia Farid, Insulting Egypt’s Revolutions: Criminalization vs. Free Speech, AL
ARABIYA
NEWS,
Dec.
11,
2014,
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/12/11/Insulting-Egypt-srevolutions-Between-criminalization-and-free-speech.html.
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The president claimed that such a law would be “the only way to show
respect to Egyptians who sacrificed their lives for freedom and
democracy.”375 A number of Egyptians greeted this announcement
with praise.376 Others, however, responded angrily, stating that this
statute would be just another restriction on what they could say and do
regarding their nation’s government.377
On the whole, one could reasonably argue that the question of
how the post-revolutionary governments in Tunisia and Egypt treated
the freedoms of speech and expression remains an evolving matter.
Certainly, time will tell how both of these post-revolutionary nations
are judged in this category. However, one can still draw conclusions
about the initial reactions regarding these freedoms after the Arab
Spring revolutions in both states. An outward commitment to freedom
of speech and expression, from public statements to speeches before
the United Nations and political leaders from other nations to strong
language in new constitutions, characterizes Tunisia and Egypt
immediately following their 2011 revolts. However, the real-world
situations in both states demonstrate an overall environment of chilling
and repressing expression that the regimes in power deems
unfavourable or dangerous — a reality that seems far away from the
ideals of liberty and openness that the leaders of these revolutions
promoted.378

375. Id.
376. See id. (quoting political leaders stating that the government needed this law to
maintain stability in Egypt and quoting a legal expert stating that the criminal charges for
“insults” were justified as speech and expression likely to incite violence).
377. Shadi Bushra, Egypt to Criminalize Insults to ‘Revolutions’ of 2011 and 2013:
Spokesman, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/us-egypt-sisirevolutions-idUSKCN0JH2AM20141203 (criticizing al-Sisi and his cabinet for trying to
criminalize speech and expression solely to consolidate his power over the country); Nourhan
Magdi, ‘Insults’ to Jan[.] 25 and June 30 Will Be Criminalized, CAIRO POST, Dec. 3, 2014,
http://www.thecairopost.com/news/130184/news/insults-to-jan-25-and-june-30-will-becriminalized-2 (“Lawyer Mohamed Zarea told VetoGate the law is “coercion” to citizens to
adopt one opinion, which he added is inconsistent with the freedom of opinion and expression
guaranteed in the constitution.”).
378. In addition to the reportage of current conditions already discussed, see, e.g., Andrew
Hammond, Cinema and Television, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MODERN ARAB
CULTURE 171–72 (Dwight F. Reynolds, ed., 2015); Mark Bousquet, Holding Strong Against
the Rise of Censorship in Egypt and Tunisia, COMIC BOOK LEGAL PROTECTION FUND, Apr. 16,
2013, http://cbldf.org/2013/04/holding-strong-against-the-rise-of-censorship-in-egypt-andtunisia/.
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III. CONNECTING THE DOTS: IDENTIFYING TRENDS LEADING POSTREVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENTS TO ABRIDGE PROMISED RIGHTS
OF FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
The preceding sections described six revolutions in which
freedom of speech and expression was a primary objective for the
revolutionaries, and a key promise for the government that either took
or was permitted to retain power following the revolution. Despite
these goals and promises, however, the populations in each of these
post-revolutionary states quickly experienced substantial governmentimposed reductions in freedom of speech and expression. In laws and
deeds, these new or reformed governments significantly abridged
speech and expression rights of the people in short order, breaking their
promises to the citizenry and defeating one of the principal goals for
which the revolution was fought in the first place.
As discussed in Part I, each nation entered its respective
revolution with a unique perspective about freedom of speech and
expression. Some movements, such as the Cuban Revolution, called
for absolute legal protection for all forms of speech and expression.
Others, such as the American Revolution and the French Revolution,
arose with the population comprehending a more limited measure of
free speech and expression, allowing for restrictions on categories of
speech that were injurious in some fundamental way to the state or to
the general public’s well-being. Still, even those nations utilizing a
narrower starting-point definition of free speech and expression
recognized a degree of individual liberty that was considerably greater
than what their immediate post-revolutionary governments
provided.379
Thus, remarkable consistency in immediate outcomes exists
among the six revolutions described here, even though these events
occurred in different nations, for different causes, and during a wide
range of differing time periods. The remaining question, then, is
whether any consistency also exists in the causes of these postrevolutionary governmental reactions against the promised civil
liberties of free speech and expression. This section takes up that
important question and identifies some answers by studying
commonalities among the post-revolutionary state actions in the
nations discussed above.

379. See generally supra Parts I–II.
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A.
Revolutionary Promises Regarding Free Speech and
Expression Establish False Expectations Among the Population
Hopeful governmental leaders have much to gain from making
sizeable promises to revolutionaries. For a political aspirant, winning
popularity among revolutionary participants could result in a fast track
to power if the revolution ultimately succeeds. For an existing
officeholder, currying favour with the supporters of a revolution that
seems destined to succeed can lead to self-preservation, remaining in
power after agreeing to grant certain demands of the revolutionary
movement.
Unfortunately, the promises made during a revolutionary fervor
frequently prove to be untenable in the light of reality.380 Plenty of
vows that sound beautiful on paper or in a speech do not translate
effectively to the realities of day-to-day governance.381 Transitions
into a brand-new or dramatically reformed government are typically
messy on many levels, and successes do not occur overnight.382 Yet
few post-revolutionary governments want to engage in tempering the
expectations of the public. Instead, they generally prefer to ride the
wave of promises that brought them into power or retained them in
power during the revolution.383 Before long, a widening chasm opens
between the promised state and the actual state, leading to newfound
unrest among a population that hoped for instantaneously brighter

380. For one example, consider the often-invoked revolutionary promise of greater—or
even total—equality among a nation’s citizens. Such a claim presents a tremendously
attractive picture to a frustrated citizenry. However, even if the new post-revolutionary
government manages to enact laws providing equality in “the formal, legal sense,” achieving
actual equality among all citizens in the nation eludes the government. See FRIEDRICH JULIUS
STAHL, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE LAW 60 (Ruben Alvarado,
trans. & ed., 2009).
381. See ID.
382. See, e.g., EGYPT IN WILLIAMSBURG: CHALLENGES OF A POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 4
(Reginald Dale, ed., 2014); VLADIMIR MAU & IRINA STARODUBROVSKAIA, THE CHALLENGE OF
REVOLUTION: CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 126–28 (2001); Nicholas
Kristof, Egypt’s Reassuringly Messy Democracy, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011,
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/egypts-reassuringly-messy-democracy/.
383. Some political scientists believe this attitude to be emblematic of a “honeymoon
period,” during which anything seems possible, even the most implausible promises made in
the heat of revolutionary fervor. See Jack A. Goldstone, Bringing Regimes Back In: Explaining
Success and Failure in the Middle East Revolts of 2011, in THE ARAB REVOLUTION OF 2011:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 68 (Saïd Amir Arjomand, ed., 2015); BAILEY STONE, THE
ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE AND
RUSSIA 200, 209, 221 (2013); PHILIP ABBOTT, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA:
CONVERSATION AND DEBATE 46 (4th ed. 2009); CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF
REVOLUTION 91 (1965).
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days.384
In the United States, for instance, the First Amendment to the Bill
of Rights promises that “Congress shall make no law” abridging free
speech, a pledge that seems absolute.385 However, a look at the context
of the times demonstrates that the drafters of this language almost
certainly did not intend to prevent the government from ever restricting
the speech of American citizens, even if this language gives the
impression that such limitations are always constitutionally
forbidden.386 In France, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen swore allegiance to liberty of expression that did not
“disturb the public order” — a guarantee that neither King Louis XVI
nor Robespierre would ultimately uphold.387 In Cuba, Castro promised
absolute protection of speech and expression, even speech and
expression that denounced him and his allies.388 This vow, too, quickly
went by the wayside.389 Similar results arose from the other revolutions
studied in this article as well.390
Some of these promises evaporate because the leader making or
agreeing to the pledges never truly intends to keep them.391 In early
twentieth-century Russia, the czar’s promises regarding freedom of
expression in the October Manifesto fall into this category.392
Commentators describe the czar’s aching reluctance to surrender any
powers traditionally associated with absolutist rule to the Russian
people.393 Doing so seems to be solely an act of self-preservation in

384. This realization of promises not kept is part of the natural and often-rapid emotional
decline following the post-revolutionary “honeymoon period.” See Jon Lee Anderson, Where
Protests End, NEW YORKER, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/where-protests-end; BRINTON, supra note 383, at 237.
385. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
386. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Parts I. B., Part II.B.
388. See supra Part I.D.
389. See supra Part II.D.
390. For example, consider the promises that revolutionary leaders in Tunisia and Egypt
made during the Arab Spring, and the ultimate results that led to continued censorship of
speech and expression in both nations. Compare supra Part I.E, with Part II.E.
391. S. Curry Jansen & Brian Martin, Exposing and Opposing Censorship: Backfire
Dynamics in Freedom-of-Speech Struggles, 10 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REV. 29, 31 (2004) (“[It]
is well known that free expression is given widespread lip service in the same contexts in
which censorship is widely practiced.”).
392. See supra Part II.C.
393. WORTMAN, supra note 81, at 363 (stating that Nicholas II told members of the
imperial military from the outset that he might require them to use force to dissolved the Duma
at his whim).
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the face of a desperate citizenry.394 From the outset, it seems that the
czar made few efforts to fulfill these vows, failing to even create a
reasonable façade of trying to pursue these promised reforms.395
Others, however, terminate despite the best intentions of their
makers, crumbling because they are virtually impossible to fully
execute. Many revolutionary promises regarding freedom of speech
and expression fall into this latter category. Establishing a society in
which speech and expression is never restricted is arguably an
attractive proposition at first glance. In practice, however, such a
concept becomes unsustainable. Several categories of speech and
expression could spur a nation’s complete downfall if left completely
unchecked, such as fraud, conspiracy to commit crimes, betrayal of
state secrets to an enemy force, and speech or expression aimed at
inciting mass violence.396 Thus, expecting any government to refrain
from ever imposing any restrictions on speech and expression is a hope
that is far from realistic.397
Still, it is a hope to which many people cling after hearing the
words of revolutionary leaders, comments that are often presented in
absolute or near-absolute terms. Before long, however, these leaders
find such unqualified promises impossible to keep — if they ever
intended to keep them in the first place — and turn to a level of
censorship in which they had seemingly vowed never to engage.398
This, in turn, leads to the potential for dissatisfaction among a onceexpectant, now-disillusioned, citizenry, establishing more reasons for
394. PIPES, supra note 70, at 44 (“The [October Manifesto] was extracted from Nicholas
II under duress, virtually at the point of a gun. For this reason he never felt morally obligated
to respect it.”).
395. See supra Part II.C.
396. For just a few of many relatively recent articles discussing this topic and the need for
some state-produced restrictions upon speech and expression, see Martin H. Redish & Michael
J. T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy As Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 697–700
(2013); Todd Stedeford, Prior Restraint and Censorship: Acknowledged Occupational
Hazards for Government Scientists, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 725, 725–26
(2007); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765–77 (2004).
397. Indeed, even a laissez-faire free speech theorist such as John Stuart Mill allowed for
significant exceptions to his pro-freedom of expression mindset. According to Mill,
restrictions that guarded against “serious forms of perceptible damage that nobody should be
forced to suffer” were allowable in the name of public justice. See, e.g., Jonathan Riley, Mill,
Liberalism, and Exceptions to Free Speech, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: COUNTING THE COSTS
(Glen Newey, ed., 2009).
398. See generally supra Part II (describing the multiple instances in which postrevolutionary governments quickly breach their revolutionary promises to the people
regarding freedom of speech and expression).
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the post-revolutionary government to restrict the expressions of a
dissenting populace.
B. Post-Revolutionary Governments Fear Overthrow from the
“Revolutionary Spirit” That Brought Them to Power
The period following a revolution is a volatile time. Outcomes of
such a substantial upheaval are rarely neat and tidy.399 Newly installed
leaders or holdover governors who are permitted to remain understand
that people of their nation possess the capacity to revolt when
dissatisfied.400 With one partially or completely successful revolution
complete, members of the population may feel compelled to stage
another uprising if they feel as if their needs are still going
unaddressed.401
Additionally, none of the revolutions discussed in this article
received uniform support from a nation’s populace.402 Therefore, even
after one revolution ends, opponents of the post-revolutionary
government still remain among the citizenry, dissenters who could
gather support and ultimately stage a revolution of their own.403
Situations like the rise of the Jacobin faction in France, the Bolshevik
overthrow of the Czar Nicholas II in Russia, and the post-Arab Spring
coup in Egypt that installed al-Sisi in power demonstrate that these
post-revolutionary governmental overthrows are certainly within the
realm of possibility.404
In an effort to prevent such actions, post-revolutionary leaders
turn to measures restricting the public’s freedom to express opposing
views, hoping that stifling the spread of dissent will preserve the new
government’s existence. For instance, Czar Nicholas II’s severe
restrictions on protestors, media outlets, and other forms of expression
even after issuing the October Manifesto arose, at least in part, from
399. See, e.g., EMORY ELLIOTT, REVOLUTIONARY WRITERS: LITERATURE AND AUTHORITY
IN THE NEW REPUBLIC, 1725-1810 11 (2014); Alexander S. Gard-Murray & Yaneer Bar-Yam,
Complexity and the Limits of Revolution: What Will Happen to the Arab Spring?, in CONFLICT
AND COMPLEXITY: COUNTERING TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, ETHNIC AND REGIONAL VIOLENCE
290 (Philip vos Fellman, Yaneer Bar-Yam & Ali A. Minai, eds., 2014).
400. Indeed, history has proven that rapid changes in post-revolutionary governments, and
even full-fledged revolts in the wake of a revolutionary transition, are quite common. See, e.g.,
BRINTON, supra note 383, at 123, 237, 250..
401. See, e.g., STEVEN A. COOK, THE STRUGGLE FOR EGYPT: FROM NASSER TO TAHIR
SQUARE 300 (2011).
402. See supra Parts I & II.
403. See id.; see also BRINTON, supra note 383, at 123, 237, 250.
404. See supra Parts II.B–D.
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the fear that too much dissention would result in the complete loss of
his power.405 When he dissolved the First and Second Duma, he did so
only after the discussions regarding substantial governmental reforms
intensified to a level that threatened his monarchy.406
Likewise, Castro’s strict control on speech and expression in postrevolutionary Cuba focused directly on preventing the
counterrevolutionary forces within the small nation from gaining
enough traction to throw him out of office.407 Laws criminalizing
“insulting the president” and other government leaders in Egypt and
Tunisia serve as protective blankets for the leaders currently in power
within these still-combustible states, shielding them from dissenting
statements that could plant seeds for a new revolution among their
citizens.408 The Alien and Sedition Acts in the post-revolutionary
United States were aimed at preserving the Federalist Party’s new
stranglehold on the federal government, keeping the rival DemocraticRepublicans out of office.409
Vladimir Lenin allegedly once compared granting the general
public freedom of speech with committing suicide.410 For many
immediate post-revolutionary leaders, this comparison seems apt. The
individuals studied within this article were well-aware that extreme
social turmoil brought them into power or permitted them to remain in
power after assenting to popular demands.411 Their fear of meeting a
405. See supra Part II.C.
406. Id.
407. For instance, consider the statements that Castro made shortly after assuming office:
“Counterrevolutionaries — that is, the enemies of the Revolution — have no right against the
Revolution . . . The rights of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison with
the rights of that people.” See notes 310–11. Article 62 of Castro’s Constitution of 1976
expresses a similar focus on preventing Cuban “counterrevolutionary” forces from gathering,
declaring that Cuban citizens could not exercise any freedom — even constitutionally
protected freedoms—that the government deemed “contrary to the existence and objectives of
the socialist State.”
408. See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text (describing vaguely worded laws
passed under previous regimes in Tunisia and Egypt that greatly limit expression from political
dissidents).. One can find another example of such self-protecting efforts from al-Sisi’s vow
to enact a law criminalizing any expression that “insults” the January 2011 or June 2013
revolutions in Egypt. See supra notes 374–375 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
410. Supra note 300.
411. King Louis XVI and Robespierre, Czar Nicholas II, Castro, the post-Ben Ali
leadership in Tunisia, the post-Mubarak leadership in Egypt, and even John Adams and the
Federalist Party heads in the United States all understood that their positions in power were
tenuous, a fact underscored by the volatile political and social climate in each of their
respective nations. See Part II, supra.
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similar fate, either at the hands of dissatisfied revolutionaries or
through an uprising of newly empowered opponents of the revolution,
is understandable. In such situations, abridging freedom of expression
becomes a self-preservation tool, one that leaders in the aftermath of
revolutions wield with varying levels of impunity.412
However, this reason alone cannot explain why postrevolutionary leaders restrict expression to such a vast degree. One
would expect that revolutionaries who had overthrown the personal
liberties of speech and expression would rebel again once the postrevolutionary government proscribed these freedoms. Similarly, one
could imagine that opponents of the revolution could leverage the
broken promises regarding free speech and expression to raise support
for overthrowing the post-revolutionary regime. Given that postrevolutionary governments manage to prevent overthrow by limiting
expression without being overthrown by citizens angry about such
abridgements, other factors must play into the equation of why these
restrictions emerge and prevail in the aftermath of revolutions.
C. Freedom of Expression Is Easy to Curtail
Among the ways in which governments exercise control over
their citizens, constraining freedom of expression is one of the easier
measures to execute. All of the post-revolutionary leaders discussed
in this article accomplished these restrictions through a variety of
quickly and simply implemented actions. The most common methods
that these states employed to abridge freedom of expression without
sparking an uprising include:
1. Portraying Expression Restrictions as Necessary for Personal
Safety
This is perhaps the tool that post-revolutionary governments
utilize most frequently in reducing or eliminating free speech and
expression rights. By depicting certain types of speech as dangerous
to the entire nation’s well-being, leaders often obtain support from
citizens who are understandably concerned about their own security.
This strategy permits the state wide latitude to limit expression,
particularly expression that criticizes the government in power, its
activities, and its purported values.413 Denouncing dissenters as
“enemies” or “subversives,” and couching boundaries upon speech and
412. See supra Part II.
413. See supra Part II.

POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW

2016]

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

FIRST IN, FIRST OUT

165

expression in terms of protecting all citizens from harm, frequently lets
post-revolutionary governments abridge freedom of speech and
expression for a reason that many people can accept as quite beneficial
to their personal welfare.414
This methodology is not unique to post-revolutionary states.415
However, it appears particularly effective in nations that have recently
experienced a revolution.416 Perhaps this is due at least in part to the
traumatic impact that any significant uprising leaves upon many
members of the population.417 After through a period of social
upheaval, it seems logical that plenty of individuals—particularly
people who opposed the revolution or were ambivalent about the
revolution—would support a government that pledged to protect them
and their loved ones from harm, even if rigorous state-imposed limits
upon speech and expression were purportedly necessary for such
protections.
In the United States, passing and enforcing the Alien and Sedition
Acts epitomized the effective usage of this strategy.418 Although these
statutes were highly charged with political preservationist objectives,
the public face of these laws focused on protecting Americans from
harm.419 Weeding out anyone within the nation who sympathized with
France, a new enemy that was allegedly marshalling forces for an
imminent attack against the United States, captured significant support

414. See supra Part II.
415. Plenty of so-called “developed” states engaged in this practice in the past, and plenty
continue to leverage this strategy today. For a couple of examples, see BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE,
STATES, AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA 81—82 (2d ed. 2008); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006); Marjorie Heins, The Supreme
Court and Political Speech in the 21st Century: The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 76 ALB. L. REV. 561 (2013).
416. See supra Part II (discussing multiple examples of government leaders successfully
utilizing this strategy in the immediate aftermath of revolutions).
417. While the present article is not a psychological study, it seems almost self-evident
that living among social and political turmoil—including acts of violence—for any significant
period of time would leave a significant mental scar and a desire for peace and stability. Other
commentators agree with this notion. See, e.g., Barry Shapiro, The Impact of Trauma in the
73 (2006),
Early French Revolution, 34 W. SOC’Y FOR FRENCH HIST.
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0034.005?view=text;rgn=main; Richard Lezin
Jones, Trauma Runs Deep for Exiles: Those Who Suffered Under Castro Maintain Keen
Memories of Loss, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Apr. 9, 2000), http://articles.philly.com/2000-0409/news/25591475_1_elian-gonzalez-exiles-cuban-revolution (“A social revolution is a
profound, heart-rending, traumatic event”).
418. See supra Part II.A..
419. Supra notes 172–172, 182–184, and accompanying text.
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from the American population.420 While plenty of people soon
criticized these laws, the strong anti-French sentiments in the United
States provided the ideal platform for enacting a law promising to
discover and punish any subversive enemies trying to do their work
inside America’s borders.421
More than two hundred years after the United States enacted the
Alien and Sedition Acts, one can witness a similar effect within postArab Spring Egypt and Tunisia.422 National laws punishing people
who criticize the government, its leaders, or the accepted state religion
appear before the citizenry under the umbrella of maintaining order,
preserving basic values, and protecting people from harm.423 As with
the Alien and Sedition Acts, this message has gathered public support
for many of these expression-restricting laws in Egypt and Tunisia,
including the Egyptian measure banning anyone from criticizing the
2011 and 2013 revolutions and the Tunisian penal provisions
forbidding speech and expression that “undermine public morality,
although these measures certainly face plenty of public opposition as
well.”424
In Cuba, Castro also mastered this framework after seizing power.
His speech to the Cuban people in 1961 announced that “[t]he rights
of the enemies of an entire people do not count in comparison with the
rights of that people.”425 Anybody whose expressions opposed or
criticized the Castro regime was pronounced an enemy of the
revolution and an enemy of the entire nation.426 From that point
forward, utilizing a platform that pitted his “revolutionaries” against
“counterrevolutionaries,” Castro succeeded in essentially eradicating
the speech and expression rights for these “enemies of an entire
people.”427 While plenty of Cubans did not like these blanket bans on
dissent, and many Cuban citizens migrated elsewhere, Castro’s
declarations that these laws and policies kept Cubans safe from
“enemies” maintained enough acceptance among the populace that the
420. Supra notes 172–177.
421. Supra notes 178–184 and accompanying text.
422. See supra Part II.E.
423. This includes provisions of the new written constitutions adopted in both Tunisia and
Egypt. Id.
424. See, e.g., supra notes 373–377.
425. Supra note 304.
426. See supra Part II.D.
427. Castro accomplished this using his early program of ruling by decree and his
constitutionally permitted privileges under the Constitution of 1976. See supra notes 319–320
and accompanying text.
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Communist leader avoided overthrow.428
Still another example occurred in France after the monarchy of
Louis XVI fell. Notably, it was the “Committee on Public Safety,” a
body that by its very name professed to protect French citizens from
harm, that quickly seized control of the country.429 The laws that soon
followed the Committee’s empowerment continued along this pathway
of ostensibly saving the nation from itself.430 The Law of Suspects, for
example, permitted the government to punish all people whom the
state believed to be “partisans of tyranny and federalism, and the
enemies of freedom.”431 Once again, the structure of rooting out
enemies to protect the citizenry found a home within the postrevolutionary freedom of expression abridgment rhetoric.
Openings for these constraints upon expression often arise within
the constitutions or other guiding documents that post-revolutionary
leaders create. The most overt example among the nations studied in
this article comes from Cuba’s Constitution of 1976, which blatantly
outlawed any forms of expression questioning or criticizing the
revolution, the Communist Party, or any values related to the
Communist Party’s leadership.432 Similarly, France’s Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the subsequent Constitution of
1791, Russia’s Fundamental Laws, and the recent Tunisian and
Egyptian constitutions all contain language reserving the
government’s power to proscribe expression for the state’s “greater
good.”433
These provisions generally formed and continued with significant
acceptance, if not outright support, from the populations of these postrevolutionary states. Thus, when it comes to state-sponsored attempts
to abridge freedom of speech and expression, it appears that
accompanying these restrictions with the promise of ensuring safety
from a real or perceived foe is a powerful and effective means of
delivery.

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

See id.; see also supra notes 327–329.
Supra note 233.
See supra notes 239–245 and accompanying text.
Supra note 245.
Supra notes 334–337 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 219–222, 269–278, 351–362, and accompanying text.
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2. Leveraging Post-Revolutionary Nationalism
Emotions run high in the aftermath of a revolution.434 For the
victors of a revolt, the period that immediately follows often is awash
in a robust, almost blinding sense of pride in their triumph.435 As a
unifying force, this newfound nationalism can be an important means
of settling a still-unstable populace, or rallying the people behind the
unified objective of preserving and strengthening their new
governmental creation.436 As a means of legitimizing broken
revolutionary promises regarding freedom of expression, however,
these sentiments offer an influential instrument that a nation’s new
leaders can use.
Nationalism becomes a particularly effective device within states
where a revolution results in a complete change in power.437 Fierce
post-revolutionary pride and a sense of uniting the new nation against
a common enemy helped spur the passage of the Sedition Act in the
United States.438 Castro used the inflamed spirit of patriotism in the
“new Cuba” to gain support for his restrictions on speech and
expression, with a noticeable number of Cuban citizens accepting his
proclamations that these decrees were for the greater national good.439
Today, a substantial number of individuals in post-revolutionary Egypt
and Tunisia independently voice their support for statutes and actions
that hamper freedom of speech and expression in their nations, stating
that these measures keep their countries’ values and identities—
including their religious heritages—strong.440 Some Egyptian and
Tunisian citizens openly state that too much freedom of expression
could weaken the core of their nations, citing this as the central reason
434. See generally supra Part II.
435. See Mehran Kamrava, Ruling Bargains in the Middle East, in KAMRAVA, supra note
209, at 44; SAMUEL FARBER, ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED 5, 130–31
(2007); JONATHAN D. SASSI, A REPUBLIC OF RIGHTEOUSNESS: THE PUBLIC CHRISTIANITY OF
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY NEW ENGLAND CLERGY (2001); Avner Ben-Amos, Monuments
and Memory in French Nationalism, 5 HIST. & MEMORY 50, 55 (1993).
436. See id. Some commentators refer to this phenomenon specifically as “state
nationalism.” Peri Pamir, Nationalism, Ethnicity and Democracy: Contemporary
J.
OF
PEACE
STUDIES,
Manifestations,
INT’L
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_2/pamir.htm.
437. See, e.g., supra Part II.A–E.
438. Supra notes 162–177 and accompanying text.
439. See, e.g., supra notes 325–329 and accompanying text.
440. See Mansoor Moaddel, The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions
of Tunisians and a Comparative Assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi,
Tunisian, and Turkish Publics, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 3 (2013), http://mevs.org/files/tmp/Tunisia_FinalReport.pdf.
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why a “Western conception” of free speech and expression may never
succeed in their lands.441
Nationalistic sympathies tend to draw attention away from the
loss of individual liberties, subordinating these freedoms to the overall
well-being of the nation.442 For some ardently patriotic individuals,
these sentiments give certain post-revolutionary governments a free
pass to constrain speech and expression. To them, the broken promises
regarding these freedoms are acceptable, or at least tolerable, as long
as the government’s professed reasons for limiting personal rights
focus on improving the betterment of the nation as a whole.
3. Lack of a Meaningful Opposition Force
The examples of post-revolution censorship described in this
article were aimed largely at stifling opponents to the newly
empowered government.443 In many of these cases, the lack of a wellorganized opposition force allowed these restrictive measures to
flourish. Without enough people combating the state’s broken
promises regarding freedom of speech and expression, the new
government’s laws and actions proscribing these liberties were able to
remain in effect without even facing a significant challenge to their
continuation.
This effect contributed largely to the creation of the Sedition Act
in the aftermath of the American Revolution.444 With the Federalist
Party controlling every branch in Washington, D.C., this restrictive
measure became a law with relative ease.445 While the DemocraticRepublicans grew to oppose the Sedition Act, this party did not have
enough of a presence to truly challenge the Federalists at the time when
Congress passed this bill.446 With one faction monopolizing the federal
government, the interests of that group dominated affairs in the United
441. See RAPHAEL ISRAELI, FROM ARAB SPRING TO ISLAMIC WINTER 294–95 (2013); John
Irish, At U.N., Muslim World Questions Western Freedom of Speech, REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/29/us-un-assembly-islamidUSBRE88R1JI20120929.
442. See, e.g., DAVID BROWN, CONTEMPORARY NATIONALISM 95 (2003); LIAH
GREENFIELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 176 (1992).
443. See supra Part III C–D.1 and D.3; see also Ben-Amos, supra note 435, at 55.
444. See supra Part II.A.
445. See supra notes 185 & 189.
446. The Democratic-Republicans adamantly opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts, and
publically expressed their displeasure with these pieces of legislation. However, as the
minority party in all three branches of the federal government, they could not prevent these
four bills from passing. See supra notes 185–189 and accompanying text.
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States at that time, with few areas where opposing voices could
establish footholds.447
An even starker example of this principle at work appears in
nations where an opposition movement did not even have a noticeable
voice. After the Committee for Public Safety took over the French
government, for example, Robespierre and his allies eradicated every
dissenter—real and perceived—whom they could find.448 Czar
Nicholas II and Prime Minister Stolypin did the same for a number of
years following the Revolution of 1905.449 Likewise, Castro was quite
successful in removing any dissidents from Cuba under his leadership,
quickly smothering any noticeable chances for countervailing views to
gain a presence in public or political discourse.450
Interestingly, the two nations studied here that appeared to have
the most active movements opposing restrictions from the immediate
post-revolution regimes are Tunisia and Egypt.451 Almost immediately
after post-Arab Spring leaders in these countries instituted strict limits
on freedom of speech and expression, protests against these measures
emerged among members of the public and from members of both the
formal and informal media. Still, while these objections from citizens
were vocal and considerable, they did not rise to the level of becoming
an organized force that could gain the attention of the leadership in
power.452 In a sense, parallels exist between this situation and the
circumstances facing the United States at the time when Congress
passed the Sedition Act, with many vociferous individuals opposing
the censorship but not enough people to force the issue for the political
party in power.453
Examples studied within this article demonstrate that dissent is
commonly the enemy of new, still-unstable post-revolutionary
governments.454 Even the best-intentioned leaders resort to measures
447. See id. (describing the ways in which the Alien and Sedition Acts seemed poised to
continue benefitting the already-dominant Federalist Party).
448. Supra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.
449. Supra notes 289–291 and accompanying text.
450. Supra notes 327–329 and accompanying text.
451. See supra Part II.E.
452. Opponents of state-sponsored censorship in Tunisia gained and continue to gain
global attention for their objections to these measures. Overall, however, these opponents still
have not gained enough political traction to lead to repeals of these measures. See supra part
II.E.
453. See supra Part II.A.
454. See supra Part II.
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preventing negative discourse about them.455 Without a meaningful
opposition force in place within the nation, however, the national
government’s leaders may not have any politically motivated reasons
to lessen the restrictions upon free speech and expression, as these
leaders benefit from controlling public comments about the
government and are not facing any threat for their office’s seats outside
their party machinery.456
On the surface, one-sided viewpoints and constraints that curb
criticism about the government appear to strongly benefit the
individuals currently in power.457 Therefore, a significant group of
organized opponents to the present leaders is necessary for a postrevolutionary state to prevent its new political elites from taking the
easy and unchallenged road of creating speech and expression
restrictions for the public.
4. Easy to Punish, Easy to Avoid
Every post-revolutionary government examined here punished
violators of their restrictions upon speech and expression.458 These
penalties ranged from threats to surveillance to prison sentences to
torture and death.459 Most likely, these punishments produced a
chilling effect on speech and expression in these nations.460 Public
knowledge of these acts likely deterred citizens from testing the waters
with types of expression that opposed the post-revolutionary

455. See id.; see also supra Part III.A–B and infra Part III.C–D.
456. For example, the Federalist Party did not believe that the Sedition Act would anger
enough of their supporters to outweigh the benefits of censoring what largely amounted to
Democratic-Republic speech and expression. See supra Part II.A. In an even more extreme
example, Castro faced no meaningful opposition for the position of head of state, and thus
believed that he could continue censoring any dissenting speech from the “fringe” of Cuban
society without actually being toppled from office. See supra Part II.D.
457. See supra Part II (describing examples in the Federal Party-dominated United States,
France under the control of the Committee of Public Safety, post-revolutionary Russia under
Czar Nicholas II, Cuba under Castro, and Tunisia and Egypt under control of various leaders
who restricted speech and expression to reduce political dissent and preserve their positions in
power).
458. See supra Part II.
459. See supra Part II.
460. Deterrence is a common rationale for punishment, stopping both the offender and
others within society from repeating the criminalized act. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical
Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1984). Thus, if the state
punishes a particular type of speech or expression, it logically follows that the state holds a
goal of stopping that individual and other individuals within that jurisdiction from continuing
that form of speech or expression.
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government.461
Such punishments were easily instituted by the post-revolutionary
states. Frequently, they arose from hastily constructed laws, or from
governmental measures that bypassed the lawmaking process entirely.
In France, for example, the Reign of Terror erupted out of Jacobin
faction’s takeover in the national legislature, pushing through
measures such as the wide-ranging Law of Suspects and freely
allowing the state to execute any alleged dissidents.462 In Russia, Czar
Nicholas II and Prime Minister Stolypin ordered attacks on anybody
assumed to be an enemy of the regime and its practices,
notwithstanding the language in the czar’s October Manifesto that
claimed to carve out a new level of free speech in the nation.463 Postrevolutionary states that imposed less draconian measures still
instituted widespread punishments aimed at restricting expression,
penalties that almost certainly deterred individuals from exercising the
freedom of expression that the revolutions had promised.
Additionally, the effectiveness of these punishments likely
increased due to the relatively minor consequences of complying with
the restrictive laws. If the laws in question prohibited an essential
function of survival— he ability to earn a living, for instance, or the
ability to obtain adequate nutrition for an individual and his or her
family, or the ability to gain satisfactory shelter—then the individual
calculus might become different. From a risk-rewards perspective, an
individual would seem most likely to violate a law and risk a harsh
punishment if breaching the provision could produce significant
rewards.464 It seems reasonable to expect that a law restricting or
eliminating a fundamental need would inspire a large number of people
to disobey such a measure. By extension, one would reasonably
predict that many people would be less likely to break a law where
violators were punished harshly and where the forbidden acts were
essentially superfluous.465
Freedom of speech and expression are hardly superfluous.466 At
461. See, e.g., infra text accpompanying notes 462–463.
462. See supra notes 232–247 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 289–291.
464. See JONATHAN WOLFF, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 200
(“[I]f the rewards of breaking the law are high enough, then the risks could be worth taking.
The cost-benefit analysis can be in favour [sic] of breaking the law.”).
465. Id.
466. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 97 (2005) (“In a free society,
government cannot defend restrictions by pointing to the risk that the speech will prove
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the same time, however, speech and expression about forbidden topics
is not vital for survival. Plenty of people live perfectly happy lives
without ever publically expressing their views on a contentious topic
or a controversial position. A person can lose the ability to speak on a
tremendous range of issues, yet this loss probably will not directly
prevent that person from having a shelter and feeding his or her family
and maintaining a safe, stable life.
Although this person may want to express his or her views about
particular subjects, he or she might also recognize that giving up this
liberty has a far less life-altering effect than facing the guillotine under
Robespierre’s reign of terror, combating the violence sanctioned by the
regime of Czar Nicholas II, ending up behind bars and winding up with
a criminal record, or facing harassment and constant surveillance from
law enforcement authorities.467 While political theorists widely
recognize the freedoms of speech and expression as fundamental
rights, many individuals balancing those rights against the stiff
penalties they could incur for exercising those rights understandably
find obedience with state-sponsored censorship to be the easier way to
go.
D. Freedom of Speech and Expression Are Not Primary
Concerns for Many Citizens
This last common factor is in some respects the most troubling.
Government leaders abridging freedom of speech and expression for
self-interested reasons is problematic, but not entirely unexpected.
Utilizing newfound power to break promises regarding freedom of
speech and expression in a post-revolutionary nation is disappointing,
but stems from an understandable stimulus of trying to preserve that
new power in a still-unstable state. Indeed, as recognized already,
limiting speech and expression in certain areas might even prove
socially advantageous for a nation seeking to establish the rule of law
within its borders.
More complex, however, are the sentiments of the people
themselves. Discussions among the preceding paragraphs describe
dangerous or harmful.”); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (describing freedom of speech and expression as “the thinking
process of the community.”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591,591–92 (1982) (summarizing a series of important societal values served well by
permitting a wide-ranging freedom of speech and expression).
467. See supra notes 190–197, 233–247, 289–291, 327–329, 363–371 and accompanying
text.
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common government-induced measures encouraging citizens to
accept—or, at the very least, obey—the quickly imposed constraints
upon their promised liberties of speech and expression.468 Yet another
component seems to be at work among the revolutions described here,
an element that is already apparent within many of the previous
observations: the average citizen’s overall devaluation of personal
speech and expression rights.
Various examples discussed above involve individual prioritizing
other interests above freedom of speech and expression. To begin
with, when harsh punishments against dissenters chilled the
dissemination of free speech and expression, the people did not rise up
en masse against the government.469 In part, this lack of revolt came
because it simply was much easier and safer for the average citizen to
refrain from the prohibited varieties of expression rather than
challenging the new regime’s authority.470 On balance, many
individuals found silence less of a hardship than the likelihood of
facing police surveillance, prison time, or even execution.471
Yet this trend goes beyond mere acquiescence to a heavy-handed
government. Several instances described within this article represent
situations where citizens inside a post-revolutionary state actually
supported strict limits upon free speech and expression. Safety and
security from an apparent enemy or other form of danger, for instance,
trumped free speech and expression in several post-revolutionary
states — not only in the government’s messages, but also in the
citizenry’s adoption and promotion of those messages.472 In certain
states, nationalistic pride in a new government encouraged individuals
to allow reductions of their speech and expression rights for the
professed “greater good” of national stability and strength.473 Ardent
beliefs in particular values led to citizens praising state-imposed
censorship on speech and expression that criticized, satirized, or
violated those values.
This pattern underscores the reality that on the hierarchy of
468.
469.
470.
471.

See supra Part III A-C.
See supra Part III C.4.
See id.
See id. Some criminologists label this phenomenon as “rational choice theory.”
LARRY SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY: THE CORE 84–85 (2014); THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL
CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING 1–10 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, eds.,
2014).
472. See supra Part III.C.1.
473. See supra Part III.C.2.
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human needs, freedom of speech and expression is nowhere near the
top. Far higher on the list of basic human concerns are tangible
everyday matters such as shelter, nutrition, healthcare, and safety from
harm.474 Even in nations where these basic needs are met, freedom of
speech and expression is still often not the paramount concern for
many people.475 Advancing personal economic interests commonly
seems to outweigh a desire for freedom of speech, as do the interests
of enforcing religious or moral beliefs in society.476
Paradoxically, however, many supporters of uprisings demand
that the revolution’s outcomes include broader allowance for free
speech and expression.477 Still, shortly after the revolution ends, these
individual liberties return to their much lower place on the food
chain.478 One might even argue that speech and expression are not even
fundamentally important during the revolutions themselves.
Debatably, the actual tipping points that led to revolution in the
examples described above generally were economic problems.479
Thus, one could reasonably ask whether these nations would have seen
revolts under conditions of equivalent government repression but
greater economic stability.
This is not a referendum on the character or commitment of
citizens in post-revolutionary nations. In fact, it makes sense that most
individuals would prioritize a broad range of tangible needs, wants, or
goals above the rather elusive and often-contentious objective of
freedom of expression. In day-to-day living, restrictions on the ability
to earn money or to receive adequate medical care or other material
objectives have a concrete impact. By contrast, the impact of
restrictions upon freedom of expression in an individual’s daily life
may seem only frustrating or discouraging, or even completely
inconsequential. This becomes particularly important in a postrevolutionary state. After passing through an extended period of
474. Or, as several Tunisian citizens aptly described it to one commentator: “What use is
freedom of speech and voting every five years if I can’t feed my children?” JOHN R. BRADLEY,
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: HOW ISLAMISTS HIJACKED THE MIDDLE EAST REVOLTS 19 (2012).
475. See supra Part III.C.1–2.
476. See, e.g., supra notes 294–297, 374–378 and accompanying text.
477. See generally supra Part I.
478. See supra Part II.
479. For instance, if France had not experienced such extreme financial hardships under
its series of unsuccessful finance ministers, the French monarchy likely would not have
summoned the Estates-General, thus preventing one of the key events that triggered the
revolution. See THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA 63–64 (1979).
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turmoil and strain, many people can view freedom of speech and
expression as a liberty that they can easily live without—and perhaps
even live better without—as long as the post-revolutionary
government is addressing their other, more tangible needs.
Of course, this statement does not apply to all people in a postrevolutionary state. Plenty of individuals vehemently argue against
speech and expression prohibitions, often putting themselves at great
risk to do so.480 Still, in trying to discern why post-revolutionary
governments so often succeed in breaking promises regarding liberties
of speech and expression, one cannot ignore the fact that for many
citizens, these rights are not by themselves worth a new fight. Indeed,
a consequential number of individuals view government restrictions
upon speech and expression as measures that are actually beneficial
overall, worthy of advancement regardless of what the revolution itself
seemingly promised to achieve.481
IV. CONCLUSION
The question of why post-revolutionary governments often
quickly abridge their promises to legally preserve freedom of
expression is a challenging and disconcerting inquiry. In an attempt to
answer it, this article studied both the development and the aftermath
of six revolutions from three centuries: the American Revolution of
1783, the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1905,
the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the “Arab Spring” revolutions of
2011 in Egypt and Tunisia. In each of these uprisings, the
revolutionaries demanded legal safeguards of freedom of expression
from their government, and leaders promised this liberty if the
revolution brought them to power or permitted them to remain in
power. However, shortly after each of these revolutions concluded,
the new government assuming control or the holdover government that
vowed to reform quickly reversed course, instituting stringent
measures that strictly controlled speech and expression in their nations.
After reviewing these revolutions and the immediate postrevolution restrictions on individual expression, certain common
factors became apparent. To begin with, revolutions encourage leaders
to make seemingly absolute promises regarding freedom of expression
480. See, e.g., supra notes 190–194, 243–247, 263–264, 325–339, 363–371 and
accompanying text.
481. See supra Part II.

POMERANCEFINALAUTHORREVIEW

2016]

3/16/2017 3:03 PM

FIRST IN, FIRST OUT

177

that they either do not intend to keep or discover that they cannot keep
within the day-to-day work of governing a nation. Upon assuming
power or managing to retain power, post-revolutionary governments
tend to fear the still-volatile national climate that produced this social
upheaval in the first place. This apprehension often leads postrevolutionary leaders to dramatically restrict liberty of expression,
reducing dissent and opposition among the citizenry and providing an
appearance of unified support for the regime in power.
To legitimize these expression-chilling measures, and to gain
acceptance or even support for these limitations from the public, postrevolutionary states employ a variety of strategies. Many postrevolutionary leaders convince citizens that abridging certain types of
expression is necessary for the public’s own security, allowing the
government to easily identify the enemies of the people and thus keep
the loyal, law-abiding population safe. In the aftermath of a period of
violent unrest and upheaval, this rhetoric frequently strikes a
particularly positive chord with individuals seeking safety and security
after such a turbulent and unstable time.
Some leaders find success in playing upon the new nationalism
that arises after a revolution supplants one regime with a new
government, convincing people to allow limits on their personal
expression for the “greater good” of uniting the nation. An overall lack
of well-organized opposition forces to speak against the leaders in
control following a revolution commonly encourages state-sponsored
censorship, as the political faction in power does not receive enough
of a push from their opponents to let dissenting voices be heard. Harsh
penalties that post-revolutionary leaders commonly inflict upon people
who violate the state’s constraints on speech and expression strongly
discourage citizens from defying these laws. To many people, the loss
of freedom of expression does not outweigh the severity of the
punishment that would likely result from disobeying the postrevolutionary state’s restrictions.
Beyond examining post-revolutionary governments’ strategies,
however, another common factor illustrated in this article focuses on
the sentiments of the people themselves. Freedom of expression is
intangible and difficult to fully define. Thus, when it comes to making
hard choices, personal liberties in this area evidently are not the highest
priority for most individuals. Revolutionaries often clamor for
freedom of expression, yet the post-revolutionary states studied here
demonstrate that most people are unlikely to revolt over the issue of
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speech and expression by itself. Other tangible day-to-day concerns
understandably appear to be matters of greater focus for the majority
of the populace, focusing their attention on issues that clearly and
immediately affect their daily lives rather than the more subtle
magnitude of speech and expression rights. Indeed, a significant
number of individuals openly support certain governmental
restrictions upon speech and expression, demonstrating the degree to
which they prioritize other values and aspects of their lives above this
particular freedom.
From this discussion emerges another equally troubling question:
whether it is even possible for a post-revolutionary state to exist
without breaking its vows to the people regarding freedom of
expression. Most likely, no state could survive under the absolute
degree of freedom of expression that many revolutionary leaders
appear to promise. Even for relatively stable states that highly prize
these liberties, some level of restriction upon speech and expression
remains necessary to prevent complete chaos within the nation. In the
still-unsteady aftermath of a revolution, a government’s need to
exercise some degree of control over the actions of its citizens becomes
even more important to prevent the state’s utter dissolution.
Because of this, a post-revolutionary government that did not
heavily tread upon the speech and expression liberties of its citizens
would need to be remarkably self-disciplined, far better at keeping its
own powers in check than any of the post-revolutionary states studied
here. Such a government would need to conquer its apprehensions of
the populace that installed it in power in the first place, permitting them
to express viewpoints and ideas that go against the government’s
views, or even against the government itself. Such a government
would need to restrain itself from using the many instruments in its
toolkit that could persuade many people that substantial state-imposed
censorship was not only justified, but beneficial. Perhaps most
importantly, such a government would need to convince the citizens
that freedom of expression is a fundamental component of their lives,
not something to shy away from in fear that it will weaken the nation
and cause greater instability.
Whether a post-revolutionary
government could ever fulfill all of these criteria and remain in power
is a question still awaiting an answer.
For now, suffice it to say that throughout the centuries, postrevolutionary governments have engaged in similar practices to
quickly and effectively melt their promises of freedom of speech and
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expression. The balances between liberty and stability, and the
consequences of each, underlie both the post-revolutionary
governmental decisions to abridge this freedom and the subsequent
reactions of citizens regarding these constraints. A deeper examination
into the positive and negative outcomes of these acts will be beneficial
in the future — not only to understand the dynamics of personal
liberties in post-revolutionary states, but to improve the overall
comprehension of the value of free speech and expression as a whole.

